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Abstract 
European colonisation on the 'New World' had profound detrimental 
impacts on its prior inhabitants. Indigenous peoples were often deprived of their 
lands and means of government. In world that has exchanged colonialism for 
decolonisation and self-determination, there remain serious questions about the 
justice of constitutional frameworks in settler societies where decolonisation is 
not possible. This paper identifies the broad normative paradigms of justice 
relating to indigenous autonomy that have existed in Canada and the United 
States over the last 200 years, namely sovereign recognition, assimilation and 
self-determination. These paradigms show different ways of thinking about the 
justice of constitutional frameworks that recognise and encourage indigenous 
autonomy. Furthermore, this paper examines the current tension between 
indigenous autonomy's perceived tribalism and the civic republican liberalism's 
emphasis on equal citizenship and unified political community, and shows that 
reconciliation of indigenous autonomy and liberalism is possible and necessary 
if we are to achieve just constitutional frameworks. 
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The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
bibliography and appendices) comprises approximately 15, 400 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
This paper begins with the context in which it was written. In New 
Zealand's contemporary political and social debate, there is much political 
capital made from arguing that a modem liberal democracy such as our own 
should not treat one class of citizens differently than any other. The political 
parties on the right argue for an end to 'special' Maori rights, such as Treaty of 
Waitangi rights and guaranteed Parliamentary seats. The notion that 'one 
standard of citizenship' should prevail is popular, perhaps because of its 
simplicity and its conformity with some conceptions of the liberal ideal. 
However, to adequately debate the justice or injustice of differentiated rights 
and citizenship for Maori in New Zealand, there must be some comparison with 
the ideas of justice and the treatment of indigenous rights in other similar liberal 
democratic settler societies. There must also be reference to overarching 
theories of the justice of 'special' indigenous rights and indigenous autonomy. 
However, it is clear that such philosophical and comparative analysis is not a 
part of the current public discourse of Maori rights, despite some excellent 
comparative publications. 1
 
With these observations in mind, this paper analyses the changing 
normative paradigms2 of the justice of indigenous autonomy within the 
constitutional systems of two of the most philosophically influential liberal 
democratic colonial societies - the United States and Canada. The United States 
is regarded by many as the epitome of liberal democracy, and New Zealand has 
already borrowed significantly from the Canadian conception of liberal 
democracy embodied in their Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
3 Apart from the 
1 See Ken S Coates and PG McHugh (eds) Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of 
Waitangi in the New Millenium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998); William Renwick 
Sovereignty and Indigenous Rights: The Treaty of Waitangi in International Contexts (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1991). 
2 ' Paradigm' is used in its (controversial) more recent usage as "A set of assumptions, concepts, 
values, and practices that constitutes a way of viewing reality for the community that shares 
them, especially in an intellectual discipline": Joseph P Pickett et al The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language (4 ed, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 2000) On-line 
edition at< www.bartleby.com/61> 'paradigm'. 'Normative paradigm' thus refers to the set of 
assumptions concepts, values and practices that constitute the way of viewing justice in any 
~iven society. 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada Act 
1982 (UK), sch B). 
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utility of identifying and comparing the shifting paradigms of indigenous 
autonomy, it is hoped that this paper can be a catalyst for a thorough analysis of 
the justice of Maori rights and aspirations in comparison with the justice of 
indigenous autonomy found in these two North American examples. 
Felix Cohen's often quoted metaphor views Indians as the miner's 
canary in the mine of the United States' democratic faith.
4 In this paper, 
indigenous autonomy is the miner's canary that reflects the rise and fall of 
different strands of liberal philosophy and ideology, culminating in the present 
debates about constitutionally differentiated group rights and common 
citizenship. This paper seeks to analyse the development and content of the 
changing paradigms of the justice of indigenous autonomy, and to compare their 
development in these two very close (geographically and ideologically) 
neighbours . It also seeks to identify the underlying tensions that exist in the 
current paradigms, and argues that constitutional and political theory should not 
ignore social and historical imperatives, and should continue the development of 
the paradigms of indigenous autonomy with a clear view of social reality.
5 
Importantly, the paradigms identified are not strictly chronologically distinct 
and separate, for the legal and judicial contents of a paradigm may arise in one 
era but lie effectively dormant in the face of contrary government policy, and 
inevitably all eras and societies will contain varied ideas of justice. 
1 Method 
This paper seeks to identify normative paradigms of indigenous justice 
in constitutional law and arrangements. Constitutional law is "an enterprise that 
actively distributes power, primarily in the form of rights and jurisdiction, 
4 The famous quote reads: "It is a pity that so many Americans today think of the Indian as a 
romantic or comic figure in American history without contemporary significance. In fact, the 
Indian plays much the same role in our American society that the Jews played in Germany. Like 
the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political 
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other minorities, 
reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith ." Felix S Cohen "The Erosion of Indian Rights, 
1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy" (1953) 62 Yale L.J 348,390. 
5 See Patrick Macklem Indigenous Rights and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 24-25 for a discussion of ahistorical and acontextual normative 
constitutional theory. 
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among a variety of legal actors, including individuals, groups, institutions and 
governments."6 The recognition of the justice of indigenous autonomy concerns 
the distribution of power of jurisdiction to indigenous groups and institutions 
within the wider state. Shifts in constitutional distributions of power will often 
result in changes in the material circumstances of individuals,
7 which is one 
reason why this topic is so important today. 
The object of inquiry and argument for this paper (normative 
paradigms of indigenous autonomy) points to a classification into external legal 
argument.8 To this end, this paper seeks to explain the social meaning implicit 
in different paradigms of constitutional Jaw, and it does so by examining the 
legislative, judicial and executive actions that have impacted on the 
constitutional position of First Nations and Native American tribes and 
individuals. This paper is primarily an examination shifting normative 
paradigms, but it does contain arguments for the development of future 
paradigms. Furthermore, it examines the significance of this knowledge for 
New Zealand society. 
2 Structure 
This paper is structured so as to give a clear picture of the meaning of 
indigenous autonomy and the changing paradigms of justice that have existed 
regarding this concept in the United States and Canada. The first substantive 
section introduces the concepts of 'autonomy' and 'indigenous autonomy'. With 
this background established, the second section examines the first paradigm of 
indigenous autonomy - recognition of sovereignty. Section three examines the 
second paradigm - assimilation. Section four introduces the current paradigms 
that exist in the United States and Canada - self-determination and self-
government. Section five develops the analysis of the self-determination and 
self-government paradigms by examining the tensions between their recognition 
6 Patrick Macklem Indigenous Rights and the Constitution of Canada (University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 200 l) 2 l. 
7 Macklem, above, 21. 
8 Macklem, above, 26; H LA Hart The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961) 86-88. 
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of the justice of indigenous autonomy and the fundamental tenets of political 
liberalism. 
II INDIGENOUS AUTONOMY 
1 Autonomy 
Yash Ghai observes that "[t]here is no developed or reliable theory of 
autonomy; modem but contested justifications revolve around the notion of 
identity."9 In practice, autonomy is a device to allow groups with a distinct 
identity to exercise direct control over affairs that specially affect them, while 
allowing the state to control affairs concerning the general interest. 
10 The 
operation of autonomy is contingent on several important factors including 
history, traditions of governance, the size of territory, the size and number of 
communities, and internal and external pressures. 11 This has led to many legal 
and political models being used to regulate autonomy, including federalism, 
regional autonomy, regionalism and decentralisation.
12 In the modem era, 
governments around the world have turned to autonomy in response to their 
becoming aware of the ethnic conflict and extreme cultural difference within 
their societies. 13 In this context, "autonomy seems to provide the path to 
maintaining unity of a kind while conceding claims for self-govemment."
14 
2 Indigenous Autonomy 
Many indigenous groups around the world have demanded recognition 
of autonomy from the states that now exercise sovereignty over them. 
15 
9 Yash Ghai "Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis" in Yash Ghai (ed) 
Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) 4. 
10 Ghai , above, 8. 
11 Ghai , above, 4. 
12 Ghai , above, 8-9. 
13 Ghai, above, 1. 
14 Ghai, above, 1. 
15 For a general examination of indigenous claims for autonomy and self-government see Ken S 
Coates "International Perspectives on Relations with Indigenous Peoples" in Ken S Coates and 
PG McHugh (eds) Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New 
Millenium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 59-67. 
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Indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada often base their demands 
for autonomy on their inherent sovereignty and jurisdiction according to the 
natural law of the Creator. 16 Some tribes can point to treaties and agreements 
that uphold their natural rights to govern themselves and their lands as further 
justification of the recognition of autonomy or self-government.
17 Indigenous 
peoples have been reluctant to compromise on phrasing their demands for 
'sovereignty' , as they wish to retain language that recognises the continuity of 
their claims from time immemorial. 18 
In some philosophical circles, forms of indigenous autonomy have 
often been supported by the liberal goal of distinct cultural survival for 
indigenous peoples, which has been widely accepted in Western liberal 
democratic states. 19 The indigenous right to 'self-determination' is more 
contested, for states want to ensure that this will not include a right to secession 
under international law.20 However, most demands for indigenous autonomy do 
not extend to secession.2
1 In most cases both the indigenous and non-
indigenous peoples view autonomy rights as critical in preserving indigenous 
peoples' culture and status as distinct peoples.
22 
16 Frank Cassidy and Robert L Bish Indian Government: Its Meaning in Practice (Oolichan 
Books and the Institute for Research on Public Policy, Lantzville and Halifax, 1989) 32-33; 
Oren Lyons "Traditional Native Philosophies Relating to Aboriginal Rights" in Menno Boldt 
and J Anthony Long (eds) The Quest For Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights 
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985) 19-23. 
17 Cassidy and Bish, above, 34-35. 
18 Ken S Coates "International Perspectives on Relations with Indigenous Peoples" in Ken S 
Coates and PG McHugh (eds) Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: Th e Treaty of Waitangi in 
the New Millenium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 75. 
19 Douglas Sanders "We Intend to Live Here Forever": A Primer on the Nisga'a Treaty" (1999) 
33UBCLRev 103,119. 
20 See Alison Quentin-Baxter (ed) Recognising the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Institute of 
Policy Studies, Wellington, 1998) and Erica-Irene A Daes "The Right of Indigenous Peoples to 
"Self-Determination" in the Contemporary World Order" in Donald Clark and Robert 
Williamson (eds) Self-Determination: International Perspectives (MacMillan Press Ltd, 
London, 1996) 47. 
2 1 See Sharon H Venne "Self-Determination Issues in Canada: A First Person's Overview" in 
Donald Clark and Robert Williamson (eds) Self-Determination: International Perspectives 
(MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1996) 292. 
22 Alexandra Kersey "The Nunavut Agreement: A Model for Preserving Indigenous Rights" 
( 1994) 11 Ariz J Int'l & Comp L 429, 452. 
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The models of autonomy that indigenous peoples aspire to or already 
operate differ greatly,23 influenced by the variables listed above. Practical 
problems arise where indigenous autonomy is sought by indigenous peoples that 
have been dispossessed of their traditional territorial land base.24 Almost all 
these regimes do not extend to complete independence, and thus presume 
extensive relationships between the indigenous institutions and government 
institutions, and between indigenous and non-indigenous people.25 The 
relationship between the indigenous government and the state require "complex 
governance framework, often embodied in a formal agreement or in 
constitutional or legislative provisions".26 
In sum, indigenous autonomy is often an aspirational goal, but 
practical models do exist in many parts of the world. The goals of indigenous 
autonomy are similar to general autonomy arrangements, but the historical and 
social contexts and justifications are different. Indigenous autonomy requires 
governments to allow and support indigenous institutions and self-government 
within the wider state. This discussion gives a background conception of the 
ideal of indigenous autonomy for the examination of the changing normative 
paradigms discussed below. 
III SOVEREIGN RECOGNITION 
This section discusses the development of the sovereign recognition 
paradigm that arose out of judicial recognition of the historical relationship 
between Native American tribes and the United States federal and state 
governments. Although in early relationships this paradigm was respected by 
23 Benedict Kingsbury "Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous 
Peoples' Claims in International and Comparative Law" (2001) 34 NYU J lnt'l L & Pol 189, 
224-225. 
24 See PG McHugh "Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and Australasia" in P 
G McHugh and Ken S Coates Living Relationships, Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in 
the New Millennium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 142-143; 172-174, and Paul 
LA H Chartrand "Self-Determination without a Discrete Territorial Base?" Donald Clark and 
Robert Williamson (eds) Self-Determination: International Perspectives (MacMillan Press Ltd, 
London, 1996) 302. 
25 Benedict Kingsbury "Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous 
Peoples' Claims in International and Comparative Law" (2001) 34 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 189, 
225. 
26 Kingsbury, above, 225. 
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the executive and legislature, it was the judiciary that cemented its place in 
federal Indian law, in which the paradigm plays an important role today. 
A Early Colonial Legal Doctrine 
Some of the key principles of United States and Canadian 'Indian law' 
predate the revolutionary division of North America, descending from centuries 
of European jurisprudence.27 On discovery of the 'New World', the earliest 
legal questions Europeans asked were questions about the scope and nature of 
the inhabitants' territorial rights.28 It was relatively well settled that the first 
Christian state to discover uninhabited lands acquired sovereignty over them.29 
European states acted on this authority to seize any territory not already claimed 
by other Christian states, regardless of the wished of the indigenous 
inhabitants. 30 
However, this early international law did sometimes recognise minimal 
legal rights of Native peoples to their lands, property, and systems of 
government, despite the rights of the European monarchs and their status as 
"infidels."31 The 'discovery doctrine' stated that the title in vacant land vested in 
the discoverer,32 but this doctrine was harder to apply to inhabited lands. To 
ensure European control, the discovery doctrine was developed further to vest 
title in the more civilised Europeans, subject to the rights of the indigenous 
peoples to undisturbed possession until they wanted to sell to the discoverer.33 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763, drafted in the aftermath of Indian uprisings 
against the British, provided the foundation for US and Canadian Indian 
27 David H Getches, Charles F Wilkinson, and Robert A Williams Cases and Materials on 
Federal Indian Law (3 ed, West Publishing Co., St Paul, Minnesota, 1993) 41. For an excellent 
and broad discussion of colonial legal doctrine in the 'New World' see L C Green and Olive P 
Dickason The Law of Nations and the New World (The University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, 
1989). 
28 Getches. Wilkinson and Williams, above, 41. 
29 Getches. Wilkinson and Williams, above, 43. 
30 L C Green "Claims to Territory in Colonial America" in L C Green and Olive P Dickason The 
Law of Nations and the New World (The University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, 1989) 4. 
31 Steven Paul McSloy "Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century" 
(1997) 20 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 217,228. 
32 McSloy, above, 230. 
33 McSloy, above, 231. 
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policies.34 The proclamation is seen as the Magna Carta of Aboriginal rights in 
Canada, but also applied to the American colonies.35 The proclamation 
recognised Indian tribes as nations36 and guaranteed the possession of 
unsurrendered lands.37 These foundational principles of Indian Jaw were often 
violated, but are the earliest expression of government recognition of indigenous 
autonomy in North America. 
The significance of early colonial legal doctrine is two-edged. First, the 
colonial legal doctrine was completely effective against other European colonial 
powers, and in this sense it is an important factor in the contemporary shape of 
North America. However, the second edge is that the colonial legal doctrine did 
not totally deny indigenous land and autonomy rights, and indeed could not in 
light of the military power and independence that many indigenous North 
American tribes enjoyed vis-a-vis the European power in the early years of 
colonisation. 
B Early Sovereign Recognition and the Indeterminate Constitutional 
Framework 
In the early colonial era tribes were significant military forces. 38 They 
often conducted wars against the US,39 and thus government-tribal relations 
were conducted mostly by 'treaty-making'. This method implied recognition of 
tribes as independent governments, because the terms of the treaties usually 
reinforced the implication of sovereignty with promises of independence.40 
However, after 1815, the military status and threat of tribes was relatively 
34 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada: A Comparative History 
(University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1998) 129. 
35 Bradford Morse "Common Roots but Modern Divergences: Aboriginal Policies in Canada 
and the United States" (1997) 10 STTLR 115, 117. 
36 See also R v Sioui (1990) SCR 1025, 1053 (Canada) and Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US 
(6 Pet) 515 (SC). 
37 Bradford Morse "Common Roots but Modern Divergences: Aboriginal Policies in Canada 
and the United States" (1997) 10 STTLR 115, 117. 
38 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 549 (SC); Ralph W Johnson "Fragile Gains: 
Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians" (1991) 66 W ALR 643, 
655. 
39 For late eighteenth century examples see Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and 
Canada: A Comparative History (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1998) 138-141. 
40 David H Getches, Charles F Wilkinson, and Robert A Williams Cases and Materials on 
Federal Indian Law (3 ed, West Publishing Co., St Paul, Minnesota, 1993) 83. 
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weaker and, the US government began a removal policy that displaced Native 
Americans from their traditional territories.41 Notwithstanding the removal 
policy, the historical sovereignty of Native American tribes would play a central 
part in the judicial recognition of tribal sovereignty. 
Early on in US constitutional history actions were taken to limit the 
power of state governments over Indian affairs "by requiring a nationally 
directed diplomacy with Indian nations".42 Certainly some delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention were concertedly thinking about Indian issues when 
they participated.43 However, the text of the United State Constitution does not 
definitively situate tribes within the federal system,44 with only a few references 
to Indians.45 The most important empowering reference is the 'Indian 
Commerce Clause' ,46 which allows the federal government jurisdiction "to 
regulate commerce with foreign Nations and among the several states and with 
the Indian tribes. "47 The Treaty Clause48 and the Property Clause49 are seen as 
further sources of federal authority over Native Americans. More recently, the 
Supreme Court has used the Indian commerce clause as the primary 
constitutional provision supporting federal power over Native Americans.50 
41 Ralph W Johnson "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy 
Toward Indians" (1991) 66 WALR 643 655 
42 Jill Norgren The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (McGraw Hill Inc., 
New York, 1996) 30, citing the Articles of Confederation (1777) , Article IX. 
43 John R Wunder "Retained by the People": A History of American Indians and the Bill of 
Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994) 19. 
44 See United States v Kagama (1886) 118 US 375, 378: "The constitution of the United States is 
almost silent in regard to the relations of the government which was established by it to the numerous 
tribes of Indians within its borders." 
45 US Constitution art I 8 cl 3 (the 'Indian Commerce Clause); US Constitution art I 2 cl 3 
(excluding 'Indians' from taxation). 
46 US Constitution art I 8 cl 3. For an excellent discussion of the history and effect of the Indian 
Commerce Clause see Steven Paul McSloy "Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty 
in the 21 st Century'' (1997) 20 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 217, 256-265. 
47 United States v Kagama (1886) 118 US 375, 378-79 held that the reference did not extend 
federal power past commerce-related matters. The Supreme Court has recently used the Indian 
commerce clause as the primary constitutional provision supporting federal power over Indians: 
Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed, 
Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1982) [Cohen] 209; Mclanahan v Arizona 
State Tax Commission (1973) 411 US 164, 172. 
48 US Constitution, art Il 2 cl 2; see Cohen, above, 207, and Morton v Mancari (1974) 4 17 US 
535, 551-552. 
49 US Constitution, art IV 3 cl 2; Cohen, above, 209. 
5° Cohen, above, 209; Mclanahan v Arizona State Tax Commissioner (1977) 411 US 164, 172 n 
7. 
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Despite the empowering references and their subsequent interpretation 
by the Supreme Court, the Constitution is fundamentally indeterminate with 
regards the relationships of Native American tribes with the federal state. This 
indeterminacy is the key constitutional feature that has allowed the Supreme 
Court to fluctuate in its recognition of Indian autonomy from the sovereign 
recognition era to the gradual diminution of territorial sovereignty down to 
' self-government'. This fundamental indeterminacy means that the decisions of 
the Supreme Court in respect of Native American sovereignty can be interpreted 
as reflecting the dominant moral and political conceptions of justice in each era, 
applying to some extent a realist approach.s 1 Patrick Macklem, discussing the 
Canadian constitution, argues that judicial interpretations of the constitution 
"has a unique way of infiltrating and shaping inquiries into the justice of certain 
constitutional arrangements", and that the courts' decisions are central to 
citizens' perceptions of a just constitutional order.s2 
The federal government acted consistently with the Indian commerce 
clause by enacting the 'trade and intercourse' Acts,s3 which regulated all aspects 
of trade and intercourse with Indians.s4 These matters included the licensing of 
people trading with Indian, exclusive land acquisition for the federal 
government, the regulation of crimes and trespasses against natives, and the 
establishment of procedure for punishing non-Indians who committed offences 
against lndians.ss The trade and intercourse Acts were successful in some 
respects, especially in regulating land acquisition.s6 However, some states chose 
5 1 The aspect of legal realism that is drawn upon is the idea that "the felt necessities of the time, 
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious" 
have a definite part to play in the result of legal judgement: Oliver Wendell Holmes The 
Common Law quoted in Brian Bix Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1999) 165. 
52 Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 20. Macklem later acknowledges that "[j]udicial rulings at best 
are contributions to an ongoing debate concerning constitutional justice." Macklem, above, 20. 
53 Trade and Intercourse Act 25 USC§ 263 (1834). See Felix Cohen 212-213. 
54 David H Getches, Charles F Wilkinson, and Robert A Williams Cases and Materials on 
Federal Indian Law (3 ed, West Publishing Co., St Paul, Minnesota, 1993), 99. 
55 Jean M Silveri "A Comparative Analysis of the History of United States and Canadian 
Federal Policies Regarding Self-Government" (1993) 16 SFKTLR 618,624. 
56 David H Getches, Charles F Wilkinson, and Robert A Williams Cases and Materials on 
Federal Indian Law (3 ed, West Publishing Co., St Paul, Minnesota, 1993) 103. 
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to ignore this federal pre-emption of land acquisition, and negotiated their own 
treaties with tribes.57 
C The Marshall Trilogy and Sovereign Immunity: Tribal Sovereignty 
as Justice 
In the courts, the recognition of sovereignty paradigm begins with 'The 
Marshall Trilogy': Johnson v Mclntosh,58 Cherokee Nation v Georgia,59 and 
Worcester v Georgia.60 In these cases, Chief Justice John Marshall delineated 
the constitutional status of Indians and Indian tribes without the help of any 
express constitutional guidance. 61 In this situation of indeterminacy, there were 
many political pressures upon Marshall, and the desire for a strong federal 
government may have swayed his thinking as much as respect for Indian 
sovereignty and autonomy.62 But the judgements do display a respect for the 
historical sovereignty and territorial ownership of Native Americans, and 
disdain for theories that ignore or subvert this history. 
Johnson v Mclntosh63 advanced the 'discovery doctrine', which gave 
"the exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the 
Indians."64 While Indians had legal claims to possession and use, their rights to 
independent sovereignty were diminished.65 The importance of this case is the 
fundamental exposition of the doctrine of aboriginal title, and Marshall's 
57 David H Getches, Charles F Wilkinson, and Robert A Williams Cases and Materials on 
Federal Indian Law (3 ed, West Publishing Co., St Paul, Minnesota, 1993) 103. 
58 Johnson v McIntosh (1823) 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (SC). 
59 Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia ( 1831) 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (SC). 
60 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6Pet)515 (SC). 
61 For a good overview of the basic model of tribal sovereignty laid down by the Marshall 
trilogy see Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen 's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed, 
Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1982) [Cohen] 232-235; Philip P Frickey "A 
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Author:ty 
over Non-Members" (1999) 109 Yale L J 1, 8-11. 
62 See Stephen Paul McSioy "The "Miner's Canary": A Bird's Eye View of American Indian 
Law and Its Future" 37 New Engl L R 733, 735. 
63 Johnson v McIntosh (1823) 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (SC). 
64 Johnson v McIntosh (1823) 21 US (8 Wheat) 543,584 (SC). 
65 Johnson v McIntosh (1823) 21 US (8 Wheat) 543,574 (SC). 
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obvious reluctance to apply the doctrine, due its unjust impact on Native 
American property rights.66 
In Cherokee Nation v Georgia,67 the Cherokee sought an injunction 
barring state jurisdiction over them, because they were a foreign nation.68 
Marshall CJ found that concluded that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign 
nation for these purposes because it was distinctly delineated as different from a 
foreign nation in the Indian Commerce Clause.69 Although the Cherokee lost the 
case, Marshall CJ characterised Indian nations as 'domestic dependent' nations 
- "[t]heir relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian."70 This decision lays the groundwork for later recognition of the 
United States' plenary power. 
The third and most influential decision was Worcester v Georgia,71 in 
which Marshall laid down the enduring rule on Indian sovereignty. Indian 
nations had "always been considered as distinct, independent political 
communities".72 The treaty signed by the Cherokee was not a relinquishment of 
their national character, but one nation seeking protection from another.73 
Marshall found that "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the 
laws of Georgia can have no force [and therefore the] acts of Georgia are 
repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States"74 
However, as in Cherokee Nation, the tribe was not fully sovereign.75 
The Marshall trilogy left an enduring legacy for federal Indian law, 
with the Worcester decision remaining one of the most often cited in American 
66 Johnson v McIntosh ( I 823) 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 591-592 (SC). See also Worcester v 
Georgia ( 1832) 3 I US (6 Pet) 515, 543 (SC). 
67 Cherokee Nation v Georgia ( 183 I) 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (SC). 
68 Jill Norgren The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (McGraw Hill Inc., 
New York, 1996) 99. 
69 Cherokee Nation v Georgia (1831) 30 US I, 16-17 (SC). 
7° Cherokee Nation v Georgia (1831) 30 US (5 Pet) l, 17 (SC). 
71 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (SC). 
72 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515,559 (SC). 
73 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 555 (SC). 
74 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515,561 (SC). 
75 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515,557 (SC). 
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constitutional Iaw.76 Jill Norgren highlights the importance of the Supreme 
Court's decision, stating that instead of merely patriotically denying Native 
American sovereignty, "the Court attempted to forge a compromise that would 
permit the United States to view itself as a nation under the rule of law while 
continuing its quest to control the continent."77 However, it is important to note 
the possibility that the decision was based on the struggle of federalism. 78 
D Qualifying Recognition: Federal and State Limitations on Tribal 
Sovereignty 
1 Federal control 
Despite the absence of a broad constitutional empowerment of the 
federal government and the recognition of tribal sovereignty in the Marshall 
trilogy, the Supreme Court quickly recognised that Congress had almost 
unlimited power to legislate for Indians and their tribes. United States v 
Kagama79 founded the plenary power doctrine in the subordination of Indian 
tribes within the United States constitutional system.so The plenary legislative 
authority did not flow from express constitutional empowerment, but the United 
States government's exclusive sovereignty within its territory.s1 The Supreme 
Court reasoned that tribes were "wards of the nation', and that the federal 
government had a duty of protection, which came as a corollary of the plenary 
power.s2 
76 John R Wunder "Retained by the People " : A History of American Indians and the Bill of 
Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994) 27. 
77 Jill Norgren The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (McGraw Hill Inc ., 
New York, 1996) 6. 
78 Stephen Paul McSloy "The "Miner's Canary": A Bird's Eye View of American Indian Law 
and Its Future" 37 New Engl L R 733, 735. 
79 United States v Kagama ( 1886) 118 US 375 (SC). 
so United States v Kagama (1886) I 18 US 375, 379-380 (SC): "But these Indians are within the 
geographical limits of the United States. The soil and the people within these limits are under 
the political control of the government of the United States." 
81 United States v Kagama ( 1886) 118 US 375, 380 (SC): "the power of Congress arises "from the 
ownership of the country in which the territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty 
which must exist in the national government, and can be found nowhere else." 
82 United States v Kagama (1886) 118 US 375, 383-384 (SC). See also Lone Wolf v Hitchcock 
(1903) 187 US 553, 565 (SC). 
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The plenary power doctrine was developed further in Lone Wolf v 
Hitchcock. 83 In this case, the Supreme Court used the plenary power doctrine to 
uphold Congress's power to dispose of tribal lands in abrogation of a treaty. 84 
The court boldly held that plenary authority over tribes had been exercised by 
Congress 'from the beginning'. 85 Furthermore, plenary power had always been 
deemed 'a political one', and thus was not subject to judicial review.86 
However, the plenary power is limited by the Constitution.87 Congress is liable 
under the Fifth Amendment for taking Indian land for non-Indian use. 88 Two 
more recent cases, Delaware Tribal Business Committee v Weeks89 and United 
States v Sioux Nation of Indians,90 indicate that Congressional action in Indian 
affairs is subject to judicial review, in accordance with the rational basis test;91 
thus, 'plenary' power is not synonymous with "absolute" or "total" power."92 
Federal control also brings federal responsibilities. The United States 
government has a fiduciary relationship with Indians and their tribes, based on 
their dependence on the govemment,93 and the 'Trust Doctrine' . The Trust 
Doctrine stems from the fundamental Indian law decisions in Cherokee Nation v 
G . 94 W G . 95 d U . d S v 96 h. h 11 eorgia, orcester v eorgia, an nzte tates v n.agama, w 1c a 
affirmed the guardian-ward relationship that gives rise to the fiduciary 
83 Lone Wolf v Hitchcock (1903) 187 US 553 (SC). 
84 Lone Wolfv Hitchcock (1903) 187 US 553,564 (SC). McSloy cites evidence that the case was 
a 'sham' case that the Bureau of Indian Affairs wanted to lose in order to provoke outrage and 
to secure the application of federal criminal law to [ndian crimes - Stephen Paul McSloy "The 
"Miner's Canary": A Bird's Eye View of American Indian Law and Its Future" 37 New Engl L 
R 733, 735-736. 
85 Lone Wolf v Hitchcock (1903) 187 US 553, 565 (SC). 
86 Lone Wolfv Hitchcock (1903) 187 US 553,565 (SC). The idea that federal exercise of 
plenary powers are not amenable to judicial review has been refuted by Delaware Tribal 
Business Committee v Weeks (1977) 430 US 73 (SC), and United States v Sioux Nation of 
Indians (1980) 448 US 371 (SC). 
87 See generally Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 
(1982 ed, Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1982) [Cohen] 217-220. 
88 Shoshone Tribe v United States ( I 937) 299 US 476 (SC). 
89 Delaware Tribal Business Committee v Weeks ( 1977) 430 US 73 (SC). 
90 United States v Sioux Nation of Indians (1980) 448 US 371 (SC). 
9 1 The rational basis test asks whether the legislation challenged was "tied rationally to the 
fulfilment of Congress' unique obligation towards [ndians." : Morton v Mancari ( 1974) 417 US 
535 (SC). 
92 Cohen, above, 219. 
93 United States v Mitchell (1983) 463 US 206,225 (SC). 
94 Cherokee Nation v Georgia (1831) 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (SC). 
95 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (SC). 
96 United States v Kagama ( 1886) 118 US 375 (SC). 
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relationship. This fiduciary relationship is fundamental to ensuring that Indians 
benefit from lands and resources they no longer have control over.97 
2 State control 
States historically had no jurisdiction or executive power over tribal 
reservations, because tribes were held to be semi-sovereign and under federal 
protection.98 This bar to state jurisdiction was weakened in 1881 by United 
States v McBratney, 99 which held that an offence committed by a non-Indian 
against a non-Indian on a reservation fell under the jurisdiction of state courts 
and state criminal codes. However, the Worcester principle of non-interference 
has survived to the modem era. In Williams v Lee' 00 the Supreme Court held 
that the rule in Worcester remained, and that without Congress' approval a state 
could not infringe a tribe's right to make their own laws and be ruled by them 
on reservation. 101 Later, the Supreme Court ruled that a state income tax could 
not apply to an Indian on reservation, as the law was "totally within the sphere" 
that federal treaties and statutes had left to Indians. 102 However, it will be shown 
later that this position has been modified in the self-determination era. 
E Sovereign Recognition in Canada 
First Nations were as significant a military threat in Canada as Native 
Americans were in the United States. 103 As in the United States, treaty-making 
recognised the equality and independence of First Nations tribes. 104 However, as 
97 Mary Christina Wood "Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust 
Doctrine Revisited" (1994) Utah L Rev 1471, 1475-1476. 
98 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6Pet)515 (SC); See Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S 
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed, Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, 
Virginia, 1982) 259-261. 
99 United States v. McBratney (1881) 104 US 621 (SC). 
100 Williams v Lee ( 1959) 358 US 217 (SC). 
101 Williams v Lee (1959) 358 US 217,220 (SC). This has been affirmed in McClanahan v 
Arizona State Tax Commission ( 1973) 411 US I 64, 171-172 (SC), and New Mexico v Mescalero 
Apache Tribe (1983) 462 US 324,332 (SC). 
102 Mclanahan v Arizona State Tax Commission (1973) 411 US 164, 179-180 (SC). 
103 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada: A Comparative History 
(University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1998) 141-143. 
104 James Tully "A Just Relationship between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Peoples of 
Canada" in Curtis Cook and Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government 
(McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 2000) 41. 
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Patrick Macklem observes, the constitutional principles set out in the 
Constitution Act 1867 made no constitutional acknowledgement of prior 
aboriginal sovereignty - the fact that "prior to European contact, Aboriginal 
peoples belonged to nations structured by ancient forms of government 
exercising sovereign authority over persons and territory". 105 The drafters of the 
constitution did not doubt that sovereignty vested in the Crown, 106 for the Jaw of 
nations of the time gave rights to the first discoverer of unoccupied territory, 
which North America was (incorrectly) treated as. 107 
This historical legal doctrine means that nowhere in the Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence that deals with the distribution of sovereignty is 
there "any sustained examination of the assertion of Canadian sovereignty over 
Aboriginal people in Canada." 108 Thus, the jurisdictional disputes that occur in 
matters pertaining to Aboriginal people concern the relative competence of the 
federal and provincial legislatures, rather than whether the Canadian state has 
the authority to regulate Aboriginal people or whether Aboriginal people have 
the authority to regulate themselves. 109 
F Recognition of Sovereignty as a Normative Paradigm 
The paradigm of judicial recognition of inherent dependent sovereignty 
was enumerated in the 'Marshall trilogy' is a unique categorisation of 
indigenous status. It defines indigenous peoples in their proper historical 
situation - as prior 'sovereigns' (if not as militarily powerful, technologically 
developed and politically organised as the colonising powers) of their 
homelands.' 10 This sovereignty was held to be impaired, to reflect the nations' 
dependency on the US government. 111 State governments had no authority over 
these autonomous nations that resided in their territory; only the federal 
105 Patrick Macldem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 107-108. 
106 R v Sparrow [ 1990] 1 SCR 1075, 1 103 (SCC). 
107 Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 113-114. See above section III A. 
108 Macklem, above, 115. 
109 Macklem, above, 117. 
110 See Worcester v Georgia (1832) 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 549 (SC). 
111 Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia ( 1831) 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 17 (SC). 
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government, empowered by the Commerce Clause, had power over Indians. 112 
The view that federalism drives this and other United States Supreme Court 
Indian law decisions does not diminish the paradigm's significance. 113 
It is clear that the Supreme Court's view of indigenous autonomy was 
not shared by the State of Georgia, which proceeded with the removal of the 
Cherokee, or the President, who supported removal. 114 The anomaly in the 
Court's recognition of sovereignty paradigm is that it was not popularly 
supported in the society that the court presided over. In both the removal and 
allotment eras, the doctrine of the recognition of Indian sovereignty was ignored 
with impunity. 115 Both federal and state policy towards Indian autonomy in this 
period derived from a 'removal' policy that made a mockery of the 
'sovereignty' notion of indigenous autonomy by alienating Indian lands and 
forced them to move across the Mississippi against their will. The background 
to this removal policy was a racist assumption that Native Americans should 
make way for European settlers, so that the vast lands they traditionally held 
could be put to good use. However, the recognition of sovereignty paradigm has 
managed to survive turbulent policy shifts to remain a powerful source of 
indigenous autonomy in the US today. This will be analysed further below. 
IV ASSIMILATION 
Assimilation has been the most enduring paradigm in the US and 
Canada over the last 150 years, and has had a highly destructive impact on 
indigenous autonomy in the two countries. This is entirely consistent with Will 
Kymlicka's observation that assimilation was the foremost paradigm of ethnic 
justice the 19th century - the view that assimilation benefited both the minority 
112 Worcester v Georgia (1832) 3 I US (6 Pet) 515, 559 (SC) . 
113 Stephen McSloy argues that federalism drives Indian law decisions: "Justices Rehnquist, 
Brennan, and Scalia all have (or had) their miner's headlamps on, dragging the canary hither and 
yon in search of doctrine, testing the boundaries of the federal/state relationship and the 
interrelationships among the three branches, including their own. The usual result, however, is 
that the bird dies." Stephen Paul McSloy "The "Miner's Canary": A Bird's Eye View of 
American Indian Law and Its Future" 37 New Engl L R 733, 738. 
114 Jill Norgren The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (McGraw-Hill, 
Inc ., New York, 1996) 122- 130. 
11 5 Norgren, above, 146. 
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and the majority cultures and nations "was shared by virtually all theorists in the 
nineteenth century, on both the right and left." 116 In both Canada and the United 
States the assimilation of indigenous peoples into mainstream society was seen 
as beneficial for all - indigenous peoples would benefit from civilisation, and 
mainstream society would be free from a demanding and sometimes threatening 
outside problem. Assimilative policies have has many detrimental effects on 
indigenous peoples in the two countries, resulting in loss of traditional lands, 
languages and culture. This section examines the legislative, judicial and 
executive actions that were conducted in the name of assimilation. 
A Assimilation in Canada 
1 Federal and state control 
The instruments of the assimilation paradigm in Canada are federal and 
state control over First Nations government, which were imposed under 
orthodox British constitutional law. This section will show how legislative and 
judicial action has placed First Nations firmly under non-Indian control, which 
allows the Canadian government to formulate Indian policy with little or no 
constitutional limitations. 
(a) Federal control 
As seen above, Canada has no comparison to the US sovereign 
recognition paradigm. 117 Exclusive federal power was conferred by section 
91 (24) of the Constitution Act 1867 regarding "all matters" coming within the 
subject "Indians" and Lands reserved for Indians." 118 The federal jurisdiction 
over Indians conferred bys 91(24) was held in Re Kane to extend to "all matters 
116 Will Kymlicka "Introduction" in Will Kyrnlicka (ed) The Rights of Minority Cultures 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995) 5-6 
117 See above section III E. See also R. v Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 1103 (SCC); Patrick 
Macklem "Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples" 45 STNLR 1311 , 
1320. 
118 Jack Woodward Native Law (Carswell, Toronto, 1990) 88, quoting Derrickson v Derrickson 
[ 1986) l SCR 285 (SCC). 
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affecting their welfare and civil rights". 119 By the authority of section 91(24), 
the federal government has assumed the power to define Indian status, 120 
d . ·1 . h 121 d I d. 122 Th property an c1v1 ng ts, an power over n tan governments. e most 
powerful and enduring use of this legislative power is the Indian Act. 123 The 
first version of the Indian Act was first passed in 1850,124 and is extremely 
broad in its regulation of Indian affairs. It has been described as an oppressive 
and racist law, 125 and as establishing federal machinery "for an all-out attack on 
tribal and band government." 126 This is because it subjected tribal governments 
to extremely pervasive federal control and supervision. 
(b) State control 
State control is not absolutely pre-empted by this federal constitutional 
empowerment. First Nations tribes and governments exist within the bounds of 
provincial territory. The theory that reserves are 'enclaves' protected from 
provincial jurisdiction has been advanced, 127 but the view that provinces can 
legislate for Indians has found favour in the Supreme Court, in the judgement in 
R v Dick. 128 Thus, Indian reserves are not 'enclaves' immune from federal 
jurisdiction. 129 The general rule is that provincial rules apply, 130 with the courts 
establishing that a province can make its Jaws applicable to Indians so long as 
the Jaws are in relation to a matter coming within a provincial head of power. 131 
119 Jack Woodward Native Law (Carswell, Toronto, 1990) 90. 
120 Woodward, above, 90; AG of Canada v Canard (1975) 52 DLR (3d) 548, 575 (SCC). 
121 Woodward, above, 92. 
122 Woodward, above, 92. 
123 Indian Act RSC 1985, c 1-5. 
124 J R Miller Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (3 
ed, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000) 135. 
125 Sharon H Venne "Self-Determination Issues in Canada: A First Person's Overview" in 
Donald Clark and Robert Williamson (eds) Self-Determination: International Perspectives 
(MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1996) 293. 
126 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 225 
127 See Jack Woodward Native Law (Carswell, Toronto, 1990) 119-120. 
128 R v Dick (1985) 23 DLR (4th) 33 (SCC). 
129 Cardinal vA.G.Alta [1974] SCR 695 (SCC). 
130 R v Hill (1907) 15 OLR 406 (CA); see also Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (4 
ed, Carswell, Scarborough, Ontario, 1997) 678. 
131 Hogg, above, 679. See also Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of 
Canada (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 116-117. 
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However, there are broad exceptions to this general rule. 132 Provincial laws 
must not single out Indians for special treatment. 133 They must not affect Indian 
rights, 134 or any Indian interest in land.135 Indeed, the 1982 Constitution 
prevents provincial and federal governments from passing laws that infringe 
aboriginal rights or treaty rights. 136 Federal paramountcy doctrine means that 
they must not be inconsistent with any federal law or will be rendered 
inoperative. 137 Furthermore, in the past a provincial law that affected 
'lndianness' ("an integral part of primary federal jurisdiction over Indians and 
lands reserved for Indians") would be inapplicable to Indians and lands reserved 
for Indians, even though it was a law of general application. 138 
The 'lndianness' rule ("an integral part of primary federal jurisdiction 
over Indians and lands reserved for Indians" 139 or "status and capacity" 140) has 
been altered by section 88 of the Indian Act 1951. 141 R v Dick142 made it clear 
that that "provincial laws affecting Indianness, which do not apply to Indians of 
132 Provincial laws must not single out Indians for special treatment, affects Indian rights or 
interests in land, or be inconsistent with federal laws (including band by-laws under the Indian 
Act) : Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (4 ed, Carswell, Scarborough, Ontario, 
1997) 680-681, Jack Woodward Native Law (Carswell, Toronto, 1990) 121. 
133 R v Sutherland [ 1980] 2 SCR 451 (SCC), R v Dick (1985) 23 DLR (4th) 33 (SCC); Hogg, 
above, 680. 
134 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) ; see Kent McNeil "Aboriginal 
Title and the Di vision of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction" ( 1998) 61 
Sask L Rev 431,448. 
135 Derrickson v Derrickson (1985) 26 DLR (4tl') 175, 184 (SCC); A province has no power to 
extinguish or accept surrender of aboriginal title Delgammuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 
SCR 1010 (SCC). 
136 Constitution Act 1982, s 35(1) (Canada Act 1982 (UK), sch B). See R v Sparrow [1990] 1 
SCR 1075 (SCC). 
137 Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (4 ed, Carswell, Scarborough, Ontario, 1997) 
68 1. 
138 Four B Manufacturing v. United Garment Workers of America [1980] 1 SCR 1031 , 1047 
(SCC). Hogg, above, 680. 
139 Four B Manufacturing v. United Garment Workers of America [1980] 1 SCR 1031, 1047 
(SCC). Hogg, above, 680. 
140 R v Dick (1985) 23 DLR (4th) 33, 57 (SCC); Kruger and Manuel v The Queen [1978] 1 SCR 
104, 110 (SCC). 
141 Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (4 ed, Carswell, Scarborough, Ontario, 1997) 
684. Section 88 explicitly denies application of provincial laws in four areas: laws that are 
inconsistent with the Indian Act, or by-laws made under the Indian Act; laws inconsistent with 
the terms of any Treaty; laws inconsistent with any other Act of Parliament; and laws with a 
subject that is provided for under the Indian Act or regulations under the Indian Act RSC 1985 
c I-5 s 88. See also Derrickson v Derrickson [1986] 1 SCR 285 (SCC) and R v Francis [1988] 1 
SCR I 025 (SCC). 
142 R v Dick (1985) 23 DLR (4th) 33 (SCC). 
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their own force, are made applicable by s. 88." 143 This interpretation has been 
affirmed by Derrickson v Derrickson144 and R v Francis. 145 It must be noted that 
section 88 explicitly denies application of provincial laws in four areas: laws 
that are inconsistent with the Indian Act, or by-laws made under the Indian 
A t 146 l . . . h h f T 147 I . . . h c , aws mcons1stent wit t e terms o any reaty, aws mcons1stent wit 
any other Act of Parliament, 148 and Jaws with a subject that is provided for 
under the Indian Act or regulations under the Indian Act. 149 
The federal and state governments clearly have the tools and 
constitutional authority to implement assimilation policy, by themselves or in 
concert. In the last 150 years the assimilation paradigm has been dominant for 
the greatest duration. 
2 Assimilation in Indian policy 
Early on Canada has conducted a policy of treaty-making and reserve 
establishment, with the government leaving Indians to themselves on 
reserves. 150 However, Canada has a relatively uniform Indian policy of neglect 
and tentative attempts at assimilation, 151 combined with some instances of 
'removal' .152 The general policy of assimilation that existed from the 1830s was 
given legislative force by the Civilization of Indian Tribes Act of 1857. The Act 
sought to end tribal culture by destroying tribal units through the incorporation 
143 Hogg, above, 684. 
144 Derrickson v Derrickson [ 1986] l SCR 285 (SCC). 
145 R v Francis [ 1988] l SCR l 025 (SCC). 
146 Indian Act RSC 1985 c [-5, s 88. 
147 See R v Dick (1985) 23 DLR (4tl') 33 (SCC). R v Sioui [ 1990] l SCR 1025 (SCC). 
148 Indian Act RSC 1985 c 1-5, s 88. 
149 Indian Act RSC 1985 c I-5, s 88. 
15° C ES Franks "Indian Policy: Canada and the United States Compared" in Curtis Cook and 
Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal, 2000) 234. 
151 C ES Franks "Indian Policy: Canada and the United States Compared" in Curtis Cook and 
Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal, 2000) 234. Franks states that "Canada's Indian policies and programs evolved in a 
steady manner and a uniform direction, continuing for the most part the pre-Confederation 
policies of treaty-making, relocation of Indian on reserves, opening up of Indian lands for 
settlers, and modest programs for government support of on-reservation Indians." Johnson sees 
the policy more like 'civilising the Indians' - Ralph W Johnson "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries 
of Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians" (1991) 66 WALR 643, 666. 
152 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 
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of individuals into mainstream society, 153 and by enfranchising those who were 
'sufficiently advanced' .154 Duncan Scott's tenure in the Department of Indian 
Affairs (DIA) in the early 20th century corresponded to more concerted policies 
of assimilation, consistent with Scott's belief that "the happiest future for the 
Indian race is absorption into the general populace. 155 The manifestations of this 
policy were the separation of Indian children from their families through 
residential schooling156 and unilateral enfranchisement for individual Indians. 157 
First Nations religious ceremonies were also disrupted and restricted. 158 
The 1966 Hawthorn Report, commissioned by the federal government, 
reported that Canadian Indian policy had instigated a shift from self-sufficiency 
to dependency, and that a communal rather than individualistic approach to 
Indian affairs should be taken. 159 The federal government did not listen. Its 1969 
White Paper proposed the termination of all special treatment for Indians, 
arguing that equality and non-discrimination were the keys to solving Indian 
problems, and that special rights and status had been the cause. 160 The federal 
Indian bureaucracy would be terminated, and responsibility for Indians would 
be transferred to the provinces. Franks notes that this termination proposal came 
just about the time the US was proposing to end its termination policies. 161 
153 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 199. 
154 Ralph W Johnson "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy 
Toward Indians" (1991) 66 WALR 643, 666-668; Nichols, above, 199. 
155 C E S Franks "Indian Policy: Canada and the United States Compared" in Curtis Cook and 
Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal, 2000) 237.Scott also made his mission to wanted to "get rid of the Indian problem . . . 
[o]ur objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been 
absorbed into the body politic, and there is not Indian question, and no Indian department." 
156 Franks, above 237; the actual effect of this schooling was disastrous for the children 
involved, and included the epidemic spread of tuberculosis. 
157 Franks, above, 237-238; enfranchisement was automatic on joining the armed forces, joined 
a profession, received a degree or were deemed fit by the DIA. 
15 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada: A Comparative History 
(University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1998) 275. 
159 Franks, above, 242; See also Nichols, above, 296. 
160 C ES Franks "Indian Policy: Canada and the United States Compared" in Curtis Cook and 
Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal, 2000) 242. 
161 Franks, above, 243. 
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Importantly, the White Paper was a failure, because the resistance to its 
proposals was so strong that none were ever implemented. 162 
Ultimately, the federal control over First Nations tribes Jed to a 
concerted effort to destroy their traditional governance structures, their 
language, and their religion and culture. The ultimate goal was the complete 
assimilation of First Nations peoples into mainstream Canadian society, so that 
they would in effect no longer exist and require special relationships with the 
Canadian state. 
B Assimilation in the United States 
I Federal and state legal control 
As discussed above, 163 the federal government gained constitutional 
control over Native American tribes by assertion of plenary powers. Lone Wolf 
had removed any constitutional protection that tribes may have found in treaty 
promises. 164 In the allotment and termination eras the federal government used 
this authority to change their relationships with Indian tribes without their 
consent. 165 State control was furthered in the termination era when, in 1953, 
Congress enacted Public Law 280 (PL 280). 166 PL 280 advanced the termination 
of federal responsibility by allowing limited extensions of state jurisdiction onto 
Indian lands without tribal consent in five states, 167 and providing for further 
assumptions of jurisdiction by all other states. 168 The courts enforced the limited 
nature of the jurisdictional extension, ruling that PL 280 extended civil and 
162 C E S Franks "Indian Policy: Canada and the United States Compared" in Curtis Cook and 
Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal, 2000) 243. 
163 See above section III D 1. 
164 John R Wunder "Retained by the People": A History of American Indians and the Bill of 
Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994) 40. 
165 See below section IV B 2. 
166 Public Law 280 18 USC§ 1162(a) (1953). 
167 Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed, 
Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1982) [Cohen] 175. 
168 Cohen, above, 176. 
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criminal adjudication jurisdiction, but not broad regulatory jurisdiction. 169 
Reservations were still immune to state taxes, or state or local regulatory laws, 
such as zoning. 17° Furthermore, PL 280 explicitly denied states jurisdiction over 
Indian hunting, fishing, and water rights. 171 
A further federal encroachment on to Native American jurisdiction was 
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The Indian Civil Rights Act is the common 
name for the Indian Bill of Rights 172 included in the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 173 
This federal legislation extended most of the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to Native Americans living on tribal 
reserves, and was a clear step away from the sovereign recognition paradigm. 174 
In early cases, the federal courts found that they had jurisdiction because the 
ICRA had created a cause of action against tribes that waived the tribal 
sovereign immunity. 175 Thus, the federal judiciary joined the legislature in 
intervening in tribal civil rights. This judicial scrutiny was soon ended, as will 
be discussed below, 176 but the ICRA ensured that tribal sovereignty would be 
subject to similar civil rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and fourteenth 
amendment, justiciable by tribal court. 177 
2 Allotment and termination legislation and policy 
There had always been a strong assimilationist policy lobby in the 
United States - in 1789, President George Washington had announced 
169 Bryan v Itasca County (1976) 426 US 373 (SC); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v Kings County 
( 1977) 429 US 1038 (SC). 
170 Santa Rosa Band of Indians v Kings County ( 1977) 429 US 1038 (SC). 
171 Public Law 280 18 USC§ l 162(b) (1988); 28 USC§ l360(b) (1988). 
172 lndian Civil Rights Act 25 USC§§ 1301-1341 (1968). 
173 For a history of the origins of the Indian Civil Rights Act see John R Wunder "Retained by 
the People": A History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1994) 132-140. 
174 Wunder, above, 137-138. 
175 Dodge v Nakai (1969) 298 F Supp 26, 31-32 (D Ariz); Wounded Head v Tribal Council of 
Oglala Sioux Tribe (1975) 507 F 2d 1079, 1082-84 (8th Cir) (voting rights); Brown v United 
States (1973) 486 F 2d 658 (8th Cir) (apportionment); Slattery v Arapahoe Tribal Council 
( 1971) 453 F 2d 278 ( I 0th Cir) (tribal membership). See Robert J Mccarthy "Civil Rights in 
Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years" (1998) 34 Idaho L Rev 465, 472. 
176 See section VB 3 b, discussing Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez (1978) 436 US 49 (SC). 
177 PG McHugh "Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and Australasia" in PG 
McHugh and Ken S Coates Living Relationships, Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the 
New Millenniu111 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 122. 
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acculturation and eventual assimilation of Indians as the Indian policy of the 
United States. 178 By 1815 the military threat that Native American posed the 
United States had diminished significantly. This diminishment was symbolised 
by the 1849 movement of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, created in 1824, from 
the Department of War to the Department of the Interior. 179 With the new ability 
to control Native Americans, the United States supported the acculturation by 
missionaries. 18° From this time until the 1930s, assimilation through 
acculturation was the dominant paradigm in respect of indigenous autonomy. 181 
The allotment era of Indian policy traditionally began with the end of 
treaty-making with Indian tribes, 182 which has been seen both as a political 
decision based on Congress' desire for more control over Indians and their 
lands, 183 and as the result of difficulties in fulfilling the terms of the myriad of 
treaties entered into in the 1860s. 184 The process of allotment was thought to be 
part of civilising Indians for their own welfare - to assimilate them into 
mainstream American life and destroy the ' savagery' of tribal autonomy. 185 The 
Dawes Act (or General Allotment Act) of 1887, 186 broke up tribal land bases 
into individual holdings with the Secretary of the Interior allotting title to 
individuals, 187 with 'surplus' lands being sold to settlers. 188 Despite the 
moderate intent of the Act, 189 its effect was detrimental as many Indians had to 
178 Jill Norgren The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (McGraw Hill Inc., 
New York, 1996) 76. For general discussion of the allotment and termination eras see Getches 
168-214 and 229-251. 
179 John R Wunder "Retained by the People ": A History of American Indians and the Bill of 
Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994) 28 
180 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 168-171. 
18 1 Nichols, above, 279. 
182 Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed, 
Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1982) [Cohen] 127. 
183 Cohen, above, 127. 
184 John R Wunder "Retained by the People": A History of American Indians and the Bill of 
Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994) 29-31. 
185 Cohen, above, 128-129. 
186 The Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act ( I 887) 25 USC§§ 33 l-34, 339, 341- 42, 348-49, 
354, 38 I (2000) (repealed l 934)). 
187 Ralph W Johnson "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy 
Toward Indians" (1991) 66 WALR 643, 659. See also Nichols, above, 252-253. 
188 Franks 227-228. See also Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada 
(University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln & London, 1998) 252-253. 
189 Congressman Dawes angrily opposed some US Congressmen ' s arguments that the natural 
extermination of Native Americans would be best for all: John R Wunder "Retained by the 
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sell their lots to survive, and thereby (along with 'surplus' land sales) Indian 
land ownership dropped from 138 million acres in 1887 to forty-eight million 
acres by 1934. 190 The assimilative goal was aided by the establishment of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), 191 and the Citizenship Act of 1924 that 
bestowed US citizenship on non-citizen Indians born on US territory. 192 
Education was a further tool in this process, targeted at the Indian youth. 193 
During the intervening Reorganisation era, 194 the general assimilative 
intent had remained strong, if not dominant. From the late 1930s there had been 
much congressional criticism of the IRA and surrounding policies. 195 These 
feelings crystallised in 1953 into a policy of rapid assimilation through 
'termination' of the special relationship between Indian tribes and the federal 
government. 196 In practice, only a few tribes had their relationship terminated, 
but overall tribes had many aspects of their relationships transferred from the 
BIA to other federal agencies and the states. 197 
C Assimilation as a Paradigm in the US and Canada 
The evidence above points to a strong normative force, influential on 
all organs of government, which argues that justice for indigenous peoples rests 
on assimilation into wider society. The legislative and policy initiatives in both 
the US and Canada include the termination of the federal relationship with 
tribes and individuals, and state/province jurisdiction over Indians on 
reservation. The assimilation paradigm is diametrically opposed to indigenous 
people remaining in their traditional tribal groups and under their own 
People": A History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1994)32. 
190 Ralph W Johnson "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy 
Toward Indians" ( 1991) 66 W ALR 643, 660. 
191 Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed, 
Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, I 982) [Cohen] 141. 
192 Citizenship Act 1924, 8 USC§ 1401 (2002). Cohen, above, 143. 
193 Cohen, above, 140. See also Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada 
(University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln & London, 1998) 247-249. 
194 See below section VB l . 
195 Cohen, above, 152. 
196 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 292; see also Cohen, above, 152. 
197 Cohen, above, 152-153. 
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differentiated government, whereas the fundamental conceptions of indigenous 
autonomy see tribal groups governing themselves as they have always done, 
distinct from the government of mainstream society. Nevertheless, the 
assimilation paradigm of indigenous autonomy will always flourish in societies 
that value liberalism and constitutionalism, as will be discussed below. 198 
Indeed, despite official government policy that rejects it, Nathan Glazer argues 
that assimilation is "still the most powerful force affecting ethnic and racial 
elements of the United States." 199 
V SELF-GOVERNMENT 
In the last 30 years both the United States and Canada have moved 
away from the assimilation paradigm and towards the fundamental conception 
of indigenous autonomy. The paradigm of self-government acknowledges that 
liberal states should accommodate indigenous autonomy in order to secure 
justice and wellbeing for indigenous peoples. This is not to say that the 
assimilation paradigm is extinct, for many people still believe that assimilation 
would constitute progress and justice for indigenous peoples. However, 
currently both countries are currently working within paradigms that support 
tribal government and development, recognise the importance of traditional 
culture and do not seek to end special federal-tribal relationships. This section 
will outline the fundamental features of the current paradigms in the US and 
Canada, and this foundation will be built on in the next section, which will 
examine the self-government paradigm in light of their conflict with some 
conceptions of the overarching dominant paradigm in the Western democracies, 
political liberalism. 
A Canada - Self-Government Rights 
1 The Reversal in Indian policy 
198 See below section V. 
199 Nathan Glazer We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass ., 1997) 97. 
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The Canadian government policy on self-government arose out of the 
ashes of the 1969 White Paper, and was fanned by the decision in Calder that 
acknowledged common-law aboriginal title.200 In 1982, the new Constitution 
Act constitutionally protected aboriginal and treaty rights. 201 The 1983 'Penner 
Report' 202 and the 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples203 both 
recommended First Nation self-government as a 'third order' of government 
within the Canadian federation, and that the right of self-government should be 
added to the constitution.204 Three models of self-government were envisaged: 
within comprehensive land claim settlements, agreements for bands already 
with lands, and Indian Act band government.205 
Influenced by these reports, the current dominant Canadian paradigm 
of indigenous autonomy is 'self-government', which places an almost inviolable 
value on the accommodation and encouragement of indigenous autonomy. In 
1995, the federal government recognised the "inherent right of self-government 
as an existing right within section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982"206 In this 
way, provincial and federal governments have based this recognition on the 
continued existence of First Nation self-government that has existed since time 
200 Calder v British Columbia (AG) (1973) SCR 313 (SCC). 
201 See Constitution Act 1982, s 35(1) (Canada Act 1982 (UK), sch B). 
202 Special Committee on Indian Self-Government Indian Self-Government in Canada (Canadian 
House of Commons, Ottawa, 1983). See J R Miller Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of 
Indian-White Relations in Canada (3 ed, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000) 352; 
Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 314. 
203 For an excellent discussion of the findings of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
see Alan C Cairns Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (UBC Press, 
Vancouver, 2000) 116-152. See also Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada 
(University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln & London, 1998) 320-321; Miller, above, 384-387. 
204 Special Committee on Indian Self-Government Indian Self-Government in Canada (Canadian 
House of Commons, Ottawa, 1983) 57; Nichols, above, 314. 
205 C E S Franks "Indian Policy: Canada and the United States Compared" in Curtis Cook and 
Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal, 2000) 249-250. 
206 Canada Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government The Government of Canada's 
Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-
Government (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, 1995). 
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immemoriat.207 This may be part of a general recognition that self-government 
is the most appropriate vehicle for First Nations economic development.208 
Despite the frequent provisions that state that the constitution of 
Canada is not changed by self-government agreements, it is clear that these 
agreements do fundamentally change the constitutional order of Canada. 
Canada has, at every step, made it clear that the sovereignty and the current 
constitutional framework would not being changed - aboriginal self-
government would interact with the current institutions of government. 209 
2 The Changed Legal Landscape: Aboriginal Rights and duties 
In the last 30 years there have been enormous changes in the legal 
regime governing First Nations and their rights. In 1973, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Calder v British Columbia (AG)21° finally recognised First Nations 
rights to their lands in the form of the common law doctrine of aboriginal title. 
The next major development was contained within Canada's new 
constitution,211 which indicated that First Nations peoples have a unique 
constitutional relationship with the Canadian State.212 Section 35(1) states that 
"[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada 
are hereby recognized and affirmed."213 Section 25 falls within the Charter of 
207 British Columbia Treaty Commission The Changing Landscape: British Columbia Treat 
Commission Annual Report 2002 (British Columbia Treaty Commission, Vancouver, 2002) 15 
and 19. 
208 Compare with Stephen Cornell and Joseph P Kalt Sovereignty and Nation-Building: the 
Development Challenge in Indian Country Today (Harvard Project on American Indian 
Economic Development, 2001). 
209 Canada Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government The Government of Canada's 
Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-
Government (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, 1995). 
2 1° Calder v British Columbia (AG) [ 1973] SCR 313 (SCC). 
2 11 Constitution Act 1982, ss 25 and 35(1) (Canada Act 1982 (UK), sch B). For the political 
history of the inclusion of these provisions in the Constitution see Douglas Sanders "The Indian 
Lobby" in Keith G Banting and Richard Simeon And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy 
and the Constitution Act (Methuen, Toronto, 1983) and Roy Romanow "Aboriginal Rights in 
the Constitutional Process" in Menno Boldt and J Anthony Long (eds) The Quest For Justice: 
Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985). 
212 Patrick Macklem llldigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press , Toronto, 2001) 13. 
2 13 Constitution Act 1982, s 35(1), (Canada Act 1982 (UK), sch B). For discussion see Douglas 
Sanders "The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada" (1983] 61 Can Bar Rev 314, 328-
333. 
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Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act 1982,214 and guarantees that the 
Charter shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, 
treaty or other rights that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada.215 Section 
25 protects aboriginal rights and differential treatment from egalitarian 
provisions of the Charter, such as section 15.216 
The third major legal development was the recognition of the Crown 
having a "general fiduciary duty toward native people to protect them in the 
enjoyment of their aboriginal rights and in particular in the possession and use 
of their lands"2 17 The pre-eminent contemporary judgement is Guerin v The 
Queen,21 8 in which the Supreme Court held that the Crown had a fiduciary 
obligation to deal with the land for the benefit of the Indians219 that arose 
because Indians could only alienate land to the Crown.220 When an Indian band 
surrenders a land interest to the Crown, a fiduciary obligation arises to regulate 
the manner in which the Crown exercises its discretion in dealing with the land 
on the Indians' behalf.221 Furthermore, the fiduciary duty has been incorporated 
into the test for constitutional infringement of aboriginal and treaty rights, and 
legislation that infringes these rights must be consistent with this duty to be 
valid. 222 
3 Constitutional Frameworks that Enable Self-Government 
(a) Comprehensive claims: Nisga'a 
Comprehensive land claims agreements are increasingly being 
negotiated with tribes. These agreements are used to negotiate frameworks that 
2 14 See generally Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (3 ed, Carswell, Ontario, 1992) 
693-694. 
2 15 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 25, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), sch B). 
2 16 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), sch B); Douglas Sanders "The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada" 
[1983] 61 Can Bar Rev 314, 324-326. 
21 7 Jack Woodward Native Law (Carswell, Toronto, 1990) 116. 
2 18 Guerin v The Queen [ 1984] 2 SCR 335. 
2 19 Gueri11 v The Quee11 [1984] 2 SCR 335,384 (SCC). 
220 Guerin v The Quee11 [1984] 2 SCR 335, 383-384 (SCC). 
22 1 Guerin v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 335, 383-384 (SCC). 
222 R v Sparrow [ 1990] I SCR 1075, 1113-1119 (SCC). 
31 
allow First Nations to exercise their inherent right of self-government off the 
newly-returned land base. The pre-eminent example is the Nisga'a Treaty in 
British Columbia.223 Under the Nisga'a Treaty, the Nisga'a government is 
vested with around 2000 square kilometres of land, which is about 8 per cent of 
their customary land base.224 The government of British Columbia publicised 
the idea that the Nisga'a government was comparable to a municipal 
government, but Douglas Sanders points out that the government has some roles 
and powers that are not comparable to municipal (nor provincial or federal) 
government. 225 
Self-government jurisdiction is ensured by removing Nisga'a lands 
from federal jurisdiction over "Lands Reserved for the Indians," and removing 
the application of the Indian Act.226 However, general government programs 
will still be accessible by Nisga'a citizens.227 The final agreement sets out areas 
in which the Nisga'a can legislate, and sets out whether Nisga'a legislation or 
federal and provincial legislation will prevail in the event of an inconsistency.228 
Federal and provincial laws still apply on Nisga'a land and citizens, but a 
regime is established to decide which laws prevail in the event of a conflict.229 
In the areas of government, citizenship, culture, language, lands and assets, 
Nisga'a government has principal authority, and its laws prevail. 230 In other 
areas, Nisga'a laws must, at minimum, meet federal or provincial standards to 
be valid.231 
223 The text of the Nisga'a Final Agreement [NFA] is contained in the (British Columbia) 
Nisga'a Final Agreement Act, SBC 1999, c C-2. The Nisga'a Final Agreement Act, 2000 c C-7, 
s 4( 1) gave the NF A legal force. 
224 Douglas Sanders "We Intend to Live Here Forever": A Primer on the Nisga'a Treaty (1999) 
33 UBCLR 103, 109-110. 
225 Douglas Sanders "We Intend to Live Here Forever": A Primer on the Nisga'a Treaty (1999) 
33 UBCLR 103, 115. 
226 See Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSC 2000 c C-7 s 16. Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 
1999, c C-2 schedule eh 2, art 10. See Sanders 110. 
227 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 2, arts 15 and 16. 
228 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 2, arts 32-109. A good summary of 
Nisga'a legislative and executive power is contained in Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney 
General) [2000] 189 DLR (4th) 333 (BCSC). 
229 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 2, art 23. 
230 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 11, art 33. 
231 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Nisga'a Final Agreement Issue Paper No 20 (available 
at <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/pdf/isspap_e.pdf> 20.2; For an example see Nisga'a 
Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 2, arts 100 and 89. 
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The Nisga'a have no legislative authority over areas not mentioned in 
the agreement, such as criminal law,232 defence, international treaties, 
immigration, banks, and intellectual property.233 In the area of taxation, the 
removal of the Indian Act exemption234 means that, after a transition period, 
Nisga ' a citizens are subject to state and federal taxation.235 In addition, Nisga'a 
government can tax Nisga'a citizens to raise revenue.236 The Nisga'a Final 
Agreement (NFA) does not alter or become part of the Constitution of 
Canada,237 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to Nisga'a 
government actions.238 Importantly, it is clearly stated that the Nisga ' a 
government is amenable to suit.239 
There are over 50 nations currently in the process of negotiation,24° and 
the agreement process is the clear federal policy for First Nations self-
government.241 This process will take a long time, and in the meantime the 
Indian Act band government provisions (or the proposed amendments) will 
continue to be the main avenue for indigenous autonomy in Canada. 
(b) Band Government 
232 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 11, art 61. However, the Nisga'a 
Government can impose penalties of fines and imprisonment for breach of Nisga'a laws within 
the limits for summary conviction offences: Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 
11, art 128. 
233 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Nisga 'a Final Agreement Issue Paper No 20 (available 
at <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/pdf/isspap_e.pdf>, 20.3. 
234 See Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSC 2000 c C-7, s 16. 
235 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Nisga 'a Final Agreement Issue Paper No 24 (available 
at <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/pdf/isspap_e.pdf>, 24.1 
236 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2 eh 16, art 1. 
237 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Nisga 'a Final Agreement Issue Paper No 6 (available at 
<http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/pdf/isspap_e. pdf>, 6.2. 
238 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Nisga'a Final Agreement Issue Paper No 6 (available at 
<http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/pdf/isspap_e.pdf>, 6.2. 
239 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 11 art 5; Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada Nisga 'a Final Agreement Issue Paper No 19 (available at <http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/pdf/isspap_e.pdf>, 19.4. 
240 British Columbia Treaty Commission The Changing Landscape: British Columbia Treat 
Commission Annual Report 2002 (Briti sh Columbia Treaty Commission, Vancouver, 2002) 6. 
24 1 This is the clear policy articulated by the federal government in Canada Federal Policy 
Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation 
of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government (Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, 1995). 
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As the incumbent form of self-government, Indian Act band 
government is currently the most prevalent form of First Nations autonomy in 
Canada. Indian Act band government establishes governments with powers 
approximate to municipal governments.242 Band councils can be constituted in 
two ways - members and the chief can be selected by custom or can be elected 
pursuant to section 74 of the Indian Act.243 The Indian Act does not set out band 
council powers in intricate detail, and thus the courts are left to determine the 
scope of the power of the councils.244 Some authorities hold that band councils 
have limited powers based on the statutory grant from Parliament in the Indian 
Act. 245 In contrast Joe v Findla/46 held that a band could bring an action for 
ejectment from reserve lands, despite no power existing in the Indian Act.247 
This illustrates the view that band councils have powers, founded in their status 
as governments, necessary to carry out their duties. 
Band councils can enact by-laws of three kinds. 248 Section 81 of the 
Indian Act allows general by-laws relating to subjects such as health, traffic, 
law and order, trespass, building construction and various other general 
subjects, and these by-laws are subject to the Minister's veto for 40 days.249 
Taxation and licensing by-laws must be passed under section 83, and must have 
the approval of the Minister to come into effect. 250 The third by-laws are those 
dealing with intoxicants, and do not need to be approved by the Minister.251 
These by-laws have the force of federal regulation, and thus render provincial 
legislation invalid to the extent that it conflicts with the by-law.252 Predictably, 
these by-laws are only effective on reserve.253 
242 Jack Woodward Native law (Carswell, Toronto, 1990) 152.2; Re Stacey and Montour 
[1982] 3 CNLR 158. 
243 Woodward, above, 165. 
244 Woodward, above, 167. 
245 Paul Band v R [1984] 2 WWR 540. 
246 Joe v Findlay (1987) 12 BCLR (2d) 166. 
247 Joe v Findlay (1987) 12 BCLR (2d) 166, 172. 
248 Jack Woodward Native law (Carswell, Toronto, 1990) 183. 
249 Indian Act RSC 1985 c C-32, s 15, s 81(1) 
250 Indian Act RSC 1985 c C-32 s 83. Jack Woodward Native Law (Carswell, Toronto, 1990) 
183. 
251 Indian Act RSC 1985 c C-32, s 85. I 
252 Woodward, above, 183, citing S ( EG) v Spallumcheen Band Council (I 988) 2 CNLR 3 I 8 
(BCSC). 
253 Woodward, above, 189, citing R v Alfred (1993) 3 CNLR 88 (BCSC). 
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Despite the by-law system giving band councils the ability to pre-empt 
state laws in areas that are central to their wellbeing and survival, there are 
significant federal restraints on councils. 254 Furthermore, Indian Act 
government can be seen as weak because Indian band councils "have trivial 
legislative authority [ ... t]he only real legislative powers of municipal-level 
governments and Indian band councils are over land use and motor vehicles."255 
Significantly, band governments have been found to be amenable to suit.256 
Thus the Indian Act band government does not conform to self-government 
demanded by First Nations. One purported step towards improved band 
government is the First Nations Governance Bill (FNGA). 
The First Nations Governance Bill proposes to update the Indian Act in 
order give First Nations the "tools they need to exercise effective governance or 
to foster economic growth and development."257 The Canadian federal 
government states that the FNGA would withdraw Ministerial control in local 
self-government,258 as a part of generally significantly reducing "the power of 
the Minister and the federal government as a whole over the lives of First 
Nations citizens."259 Furthermore, it would strengthen First Nations 
governments by giving them better law-making authority.260 
In contrast to the government position, many First Nations peoples and 
groups see the FNGA as a negative piece of legislation. The Assembly of First 
Nations (AFN) rejects the FNGA as an entrenchment of the Indian Act. 261 It 
sees the FNGA as a 'one size fits all' approach to self-government, and argues 
against its removal of traditional leadership, and its definition of the band legal 
254 The Governor in Council and the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development have 
sif nificant powers over band governments. See Woodward, above, 153-159. 
25 Douglas Sanders "The Constitution, the Provinces, and Aboriginal Peoples" in J Anthony 
Long and Menno Boldt (eds) Governments in Conflict ?: Provinces and Indian Nations in 
Canada (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1988) 153. 
256 Spring hill Lumber Ltd v Lake St Martin Indian Band [ 1986] 2 CNLR 179 (Man QB); Clow 
Darling Ltd v Big Trout Lake Band of Indians [ 1990] 4 CNLR 7 (Ont Dist Ct) ; 
257 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Communities First: First Nations Governance 
<http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/nr/prs/j-a200l/O l 136bk_e.html> last accessed 30 September 2003. 
258 Canada <http://www.fng-gpn .gc .ca/QAla_e.html#bottoml> last accessed 30 September 
2003. 
259 Canada <http://www.fng-gpn .gc.ca/QA la_e.html#bottom l > 
260 Canada <http://www.fng-gpn .gc.ca/QA la_e.html#bottom I> 
26 1 Assembly of First Nations (AFN) Bill C-7- First Nations Governance Act (available at 
<http://www.afn.ca/Legislation%20Info/billc7.htm> last accessed 30 September 2003) 
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capacity to that of a natural person, rather than a nation.262 The AFN argues for 
nation-building to be carried out that gives genuine self-rule over First Nations 
affairs on reserves, culturally appropriate governance institutions and long-term 
vision of the place of First Nations in Canada. 263 
On its face, the proposed legislation matches the government's 
description. The preamble to the proposed legislation makes it clear that it does 
not alter the inherent right of self-government.264 The legislation itself clearly 
purports not to change the legal of the bands.265 The arguments against the 
FNGA put forward by First Nations seem to be based on the legacy of distrust 
of the Canadian government and the operation of the Indian Act, for the 
proposed legislation does seem to give First Nations better tools to conduct their 
government. 
(d) Public government - Nunavut territory 
The final, and least prevalent, form of self-government is the public 
government model. After over 20 years of negotiation,266 the territory of 
Nunavut was created by partitioning the Northwestern Territories on 1 April 
1999.267 It has a public and democratic system of government, which combined 
with the demographics of an 85 per cent Inuit population, gives self-government 
to the indigenous citizens.268 The territory contains about one fifth of Canada's 
land mass, roughly two million square kilometres.269 Territories are primarily 
262 AFN Bill C-7- First Nations Governance Act 
<http://www.afn.ca/Legis1ation%20Info/billc7.htm> last accessed 30 September 2003. 
263 AFN Bill C-7- First Nations Governance Act 
<http://www.afn.ca/Legis1ation%20Info/billc7.htm> 
264 Bill C-7 First Nations Governance Act, preamble "Whereas neither the Indian Act nor thi s 
Act is intended to define the nature and scope of any right of self-government or to prejudge the 
outcome of any self-government negotiation". 
265 Bill C-7 First Nations Governance Act, s 15(3). 
266 Alexandra Kersey "The Nunavut Agreement: A Model for Preserving Indigenous Rights" 
(1994) 11 Ariz J Int'I & Comp L429, 435-441. 
267 Charles J Marecic "Nunavut Territory: Aboriginal Governing in the Canadian Regime of 
Governance" (2000) 24 AMINDLR 275 279; Nunavut needed two acts, the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement Act RSC 1992 c C-29 and the Nunavut Act RSC 1993 c C-28 to bring the 
territory into force. 
268 Charles J Marecic "Nunavut Territory: Aboriginal Governing in the Canadian Regime of 
Governance" (2000) 24 AMINDLR 275, 279. 
269 Charles J Marecic "Nunavut Territory: Aboriginal Governing in the Canadian Regime of 
Governance" (2000) 24 AMINDLR 275, 277. 
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controlled by and under the jurisdiction of the federal government, but can be 
delegated authority. Nunavut will has a legislature with a mix of municipal-type 
and provincial-type powers270 include the administration of justice, taxation, 
property rights, language,271 but the legislature is not delegated any more 
powers than the provinces.272 The Nunavut Court of Justice and the Court of 
Appeal of Nunavut have also been established.273 
The public government model will only be useful in areas where First 
Nations people form the majority. However, the self-government that it allows 
Inuit is significant, approaching powers of a province. 
B United States - Self-Determination 
I Self-determination policy 
The philosophical forerunner to the present era of self-determination 
was the era of reorganisation.274 In the late 1920s there was a departure from 
many of the assimilative goals of the allotment era, with some tolerance, and 
even respect for the traditional aspects of Indian culture.275 John Collier, the 
new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, quickly ended the issuing of fee patents, 
the sale of traditional lands and the allotment process.276 Indian Reorganisation 
Act (IRA) of 1934277 advanced Collier's goals of economic development, self-
determination and tribalism by encouraging tribes to organize - to adopt 
270 Jeffrey Wutzke "Dependent Independence: Application of the Nunavut Model to Native 
Hawaiian Sovereignty and Self-Determination Claims" (1998) 22 AMINDLR 509, 538. 
271 Nunavut Act 1993, c C-28, s 23(1) . 
272 Nunavut Act 1993, c C-28, s 23(2) . 
273 Nunavut Act 1993, c C-28, s 31( I). 
274 For general discussions of the reorganisation era see Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen 's 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed, Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 
1982) [Cohen] 144-152 and David H Getches, Charles F Wilkinson, and Robert A Williams 
Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law (3 ed, West Publishing Co., St Paul , Minnessota, 
1993) 215-228. 
275 Cohen, above, 144-145. See also Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada 
(University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln & London, 1998) 280-281. 
276 Cohen, above, 146. 
277 Indian Reorganisation Act 1934 25 USC§§ 461-479 See Cohen 147. 
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constitutions and by-laws for their common welfare.278 However, while the Act 
gave tribes a measure of self-government, it was not an overall success, as it 
was much watered-down and misused to serve government interests.279 
Furthermore, many Native Americans were suspicious of the new governance 
structures, and were reluctant to make use of the IRA.280 The advent of World 
War Two stifled the budgeted spending on Indian governments,281 but the 
reorganisation policy was a watershed in Indian-federal relations, and would 
return to dominance several decades later.282 
The Termination policy that succeeded the Reorganisation era was 
formally renounced in 1970 when President Nixon, faced with "hostility among 
the Indian population and with clear evidence that termination not only did not 
work but was a disaster",283 announced a policy of self-determination.284 The 
militant self-determination movements from the 1960s onward were also a 
constant pressure for change.285 This militancy, along with other currents of 
social reform, saw Congress respond with legislation.286 Under self-
determination policies moved towards acknowledging and promoting cultural 
pluralism, community and collectivism.287 
2 Legislative initiatives - funding self-determination 
278 C ES Franks "Indian Policy: Canada and the United States Compared" in Curtis Cook and 
Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal, 2000) 23 I. 
279 Franks, above, 231. 
280 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 280. 
28 1 Ralph W Johnson "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy 
Toward Indians" (1991) 66 WALR 643,662. 
282 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 279. 
283 C ES Franks "Indian Policy: Canada and the United States Compared" in Curtis Cook and 
Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal , 2000) 233. 
284 For general discussion of the self-determination era see Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S 
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian law (1982 ed, Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, 
Virginia, 1982) [Cohen] 180-206 and David H Getches, Charles F Wilkinson, and Robert A 
Williams Cases and Materials on Federal Indian law (3 ed, West Publishing Co. , St Paul , 
Minnessota, 1993) 251-285. 
285 See Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 300-302. 
286 Nichols, above, 308. 
287 Franks, above, 233. 
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In the self-determination era there has been consistent congressional 
and presidential support of the policy, with statutes affirming and delegating 
power to tribal governments, the support of tribal courts and the affirmation of 
the government-to-government relationship.288 An early manifestation of self-
determination policy was the 1968 legislation establishing a tribal consent 
provision, so that no state could acquire PL 280 jurisdiction unless tribes 
agreed.289 The Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act290 put 
in place significant support for the principle of self-determination through 
Indian involvement, participation, and direction of educational and service 
programs.291 The legislation provided funds to improve Native American 
educational facilities, and gave Indian leaders and communities the power to 
participate in planning and delivery.292 The Tribal Self Governance Act293 
further supports self-determination, by instigating a process "by which 
resources dedicated to administering and implementing Indian programs are 
removed from Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) personnel and placed directly into 
the hands of tribal governments."294 The most important part of this Act is a 
section on funding agreements, which basically allows tribes more funding to 
carry out programmes and the BIA less.295 Tribes can also take control over 
non-BIA programmes.296 Tribes are also empowered to redesign programs to 
suit their tribal tradition, customs, and circumstances.297 
288 Joseph William Singer "Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal 
Sovereignty" (2003) 37 New Eng L Rev 641, 648. 
289 Indian Civil Rights Act (1968) 25 USC§ 1326; see David H Getches, Charles F Wilkinson, 
and Robert A Williams Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law (3 ed, West Publishing Co., 
St Paul, Minnessota, 1993) 482. 
290 Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (1975) 25 USC 14, sch II§§ 450-
458; the Act's statement of findings acknowledges the goal of self-determination - "The 
Congress hereby recognizes the obligation of the United States to respond to the strong 
expression of the Indian people for self-determination": 25 USC 14, sch ll §§ 450a(a). 
291 The Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (1975) 25 USC 14, sch II § 
450a; Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 309. 
292 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 309. 
293 Indian Self Determination Act (I 994) 25 USC§ 458aa. 
294 Tadd M Johnson and James Hamilton "Self-governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism 
to Empowerment" (1995) 27 CTLR 1251, 1251. 
295 Johnson and Hamilton, above, 1270-1271. 
296 Johnson and Hami !ton, above, 1271. 
297 Johnson and Hamilton, above, 1272. 
39 
3 Indigenous autonomy in the courts: self-determination as self-
government 
(a) Tribal sovereignty 
As seen above, there is recognition of tribal sovereignty within the US 
constitutional system.298 Tribal sovereignty is not sourced in the US 
Constitution, but is inherent,299 and tribes retain all aspects of sovereignty that 
are not (explicitly or implicitly) withdrawn by treaty or statute, and not 
withdrawn by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.300 
Moreover, Indian tribes are, in some circumstances, protected by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.301 Therefore, they can not be sued without the consent of 
Congress.302 
In terms of substantive self-government powers, tribes have inherent 
powers to provide for the punishment of offences by their members (but not 
non-Indians303) on the reservation. 304 Tribes have the power to legislate on areas 
where tribes have traditionally exercised legislative power are domestic 
relations (marriages, divorces, guardianship) and descent of property. 305 
Importantly, tribes can legislate to impose taxes on their members and non-
members holding property or conducting activities on their reservation. 306 
Tribes have broad powers to utilise reservation property,307 and can exclude 
people from their reserves. 308 Tribes have the power to administer justice on 
298 See above section III. 
299 See White Mountain Apache Tribe v Bracker (1980) 448 US 136, 142 (SC) - "Indian tribes 
are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their 
territory"; Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe ( 1982) 455 US 130, 159 (SC). 
300 Bottomly v Passamaquoddy Tribe (1979) 599 F 2d 1061; Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe 
(1978) 435 US 191; Montana v United States (1981) 450 US 544 (SC). 
301 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe (199 l) 498 US 505, 509-
510 (SC). 
302 Long v Chemehuevi Indian Reservation (1981) 454 US 831 (SC). 
303 Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe ( 1978) 435 US 19 l, 195 (SC). 
304 Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (I 982 ed, 
Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1982) [Cohen] 248. Iron Crow v Oglala Sioux 
Tribe (l 956) 23 l F2d 89, 99 (8th Cir). 
305 Cohen, above, 249. 
306 Cohen, above, 249-250. But note the recent cases mentioned below that curtail taxat10n over 
non-members, such as Atkinso11 Trading Co, Inc. v Shirley (200 I) 53 l US I 009 (SC). 
307 Cohen, above, 250. 
308 Cohe11, above, 252. 
40 
reservation, based on their fundamental sovereignty,309 unless this power has 
been removed by explicit legislation or has been given up by the tribe, either 
expressly or as a part of it coming under the jurisdiction of the United States.310 
Most tribes operate their own tribal courts, with the structure and procedure 
mostly determined by their members.311 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act312 
allows gaming on reservation to the extent that it is permitted in the wider state. 
(b) From sovereignty to self-government 
In the self-determination era, the US judiciary has moved away from 
the Worcester conception of tribal sovereignty, and the Kagama conception of 
exclusive federal control over tribes, toward diminished tribal sovereignty and 
increasing state control.313 Philip Frickey notes that non-Indian ownership of 
reservation lands means that they are no longer geographical enclaves.314 The 
Worcester state-tribe relationship that was based on tribal sovereignty has been 
changed to a 'pre-emption' basis for immunity from state jurisdiction.315 In 
McClanahan v State Tax Commission316 the Supreme Court decided that 
immunity from state law no longer depends on "sovereignty," but now depends 
on "pre-emption" analysis. 317 The pre-emption analysis denies state jurisdiction 
where the federal government "has so fully occupied the field of law that there 
is no room left for state action."318 If the dispute in question is between Indians 
only, federal preemption will not be hard for the Court to find. 319 If the dispute 
309 Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed, 
Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1982) 249 citing Ex Parte Crow Dog (1883) 
109 US 556, 568 (SC). 
310 Cohen, above, 250, citing United States v Wheeler (1978) 435 US 313 (SC). 
311 Cohen, above, 251. 
312 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (2000) 25 USC§§ 2701-2721. 
313 David E Wilkins American Indian Sovereignty and the US Supreme Court: The Masking of 
Justice (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1997) 276-279. 
3 14 Philip P Frickey "A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of 
Indian Tribal Authority over Non-Members" (1999) 109 Yale L J 1, 15-16. 
315 Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 ed, 
Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1982) [Cohen] 269-275. 
316 McClanahan v State Tax Commission (1973) 411 US 164, 172 (SC). 
317 See Cohen, above, 272-279 for analysis of state pre-emption in Indian law. 
318 Ralph W Johnson "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy 
Toward Indians" (1991) 66 WALR 643,696. 
319 Johnson, above, 697; White Mountain Apache Tribe v Bracker (1980) 448 US 136 (SC), 
Nevada v Hicks (2001) 533 US 353 (SC). 
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is between non-Indians, the court will have difficulty finding preemption.320 
There is no rigid rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular state 
law may be applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members.321 
In 1978, Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe322 the Supreme Court 
deprived tribes of any power to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians on the 
tribes' own reservations.323 Then in 1981, Montana v United States324 extended 
this to civil jurisdiction, and held that tribes can not exercise power over non-
members beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations without express congressional delegation, because 
such power is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.325 The court 
limited its finding to regulation of non-Indian conduct on reservation lands 
owned by non-Indians,326 and also that regulation could occur if the non-Indian 
had a consensual relationship with the tribe, or the conduct threatened the 
political integrity or welfare of the tribe. 327 
Since the decision in Montana , the Supreme Court has not given full 
effect to its two limitations. It has effectively taken away tribal jurisdiction over 
non-members on non-member land, even if substantial tribal interests are 
involved.328 Tribes cannot apply zoning laws to non-members on non-member 
lands,329 cannot apply tort laws to lawsuits between non-Indians for car crashes 
320 Ralph W Johnson "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy 
Toward Indians" (1991) 66 WALR 643,697. 
32 1 White Mountain Apache Tribe v Bracker (1980) 448 US 136, 142 (SC). 
322 Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) 435 US 191 (SC). For an extremely detailed 
discussion of this case and its implications see David E Wilkins American Indian Sovereignty 
and the US Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1997) 
189-215. 
323 Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe ( 1978) 435 US 191, 195 (SC). 
324 Montana v United States (1981) 450 US 544 (SC). 
325 Montana v United States (1981) 450 US 544,565 (SC). L Scott Gould states bluntly that 
"Montana has replaced Worcester as the paradigm of tribal sovereignty." L Scott Gould "Tough 
Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty after Atkinson and Hicks" (2003) 37 New Eng L Rev 
669, 692. 
326 Montana v United States (1981) 450 US 544, 563-565 (SC). 
327 Montana v United States (1981) 450 US 544, 566 (SC); See Joseph William Singer "Canons 
of Conquest: The Supreme Court ' s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty" (2003) 37 l\1ELR 641 , 650-
651. 
328 Joseph William Singer "Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court' s Attack on Tribal 
Sovereignty" (2003) 37 NELR 641 , 652. 
329 Brendale v Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation (1989) 492 US 408 
(SC) . 
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d 330 d . I d" f . on state roa s, an cannot impose taxes on non- n tan owners o reservation 
lands.331 More recently the Supreme Court has ruled, in Nevada v Hicks,332 that 
states have an inherent jurisdiction on reservations,333 and that generally a 
tribe's sovereign powers do not extend to the activities of non-members of the 
tribe except to the extent necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations.334 In the same year the Court held that a non-member 
with a consensual relationship with an Indian tribe in one area does not trigger 
tribal civil authority over the non-member in another area. 335 One commentator 
argues that these two decisions "effectively discard what little may have 
remained of territorial sovereignty."336 These decisions seem to affirm Stephen 
McSloy's argument that Native Americans should "stay out of the mine" of the 
Supreme Court and look to other ways to affirm their sovereignty and self-
government. 337 
However, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court's historical 
recognition of sovereignty still allows tribes sovereign immunity,338 and tribes 
can only be sued if Congress has allowed the suit or the tribe has unequivocally 
. d . . 339 Th . . . . f . . 340 waive immurnty. e strong presumption is agamst a waiver o immurnty, 
but the Supreme Court has held that an agreement to arbitrate disputes under a 
contract is sufficient to waive sovereign immunity341 The application of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) is tied-in with sovereign immunity .342 Soon 
330 Strate v A-1 Contractors (1997) 520 US 438 (SC). 
331 Atkinson Trading Co. v Shirley (2001) 532 US 645 (SC). 
332 Nevada v Hicks (2001) 533 US 353 (SC). 
333 Nevada v Hicks (2001) 533 US 353,365 (SC). 
334 Nevada v Hicks (2001) 533 US 353, 359 (SC). For a severely critical commentary on the 
case see Gloria Valencia-Weber "The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from 
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const 
L 405, 409-41 l. 
335 Atkinson Trading Co, Inc. v Shirley (200 l) 531 US 1009 (SC). 
336 L Scott Gould "Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty after Atkinson and Hicks" 
(2003) 37 NELR 669, 670. 
337 Stephen Paul McSloy "The "Miner' s Canary": A Bird's Eye View of American Indian Law 
and Its Future" 37 New Engl L R 733, 741. 
338 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez (l 978) 436 US 49, 58 (SC). 
339 Kiowa Tribe v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 US 757 (SC). 
340 Demo11ti11ey v US (2001) 255 F 3d 801 (9th Cir). 
341 C&L Enterprises, Inc. v Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma (2001) 532 US 41 l 
(SC); See Gabriel S Galanda "Reservations of Right: A Practitioner's Guide to Indian Law" 
(2002) 32-FALL Brief 64. 
342 See generally Rennard Strickland (ed) Felix S Cohen 's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 
(1982 ed, Michie/Bobbs-Merril, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1982) [Cohen] 666-670. 
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after the ICRA's enactment, the federal courts began intervening in matters of 
tribal self-regulation by applying the due process, equal protection and bill of 
attainder clauses to the tribes. 343 The federal courts argued that the ICRA had 
created a cause of action against tribes that waived the tribal sovereign 
immunity.344 However, in Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez345 the Supreme Court 
ruled, consistent with the Worcester conception of tribal sovereignty, that 
"Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law 
immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers."346 The ICRA 
had not expressly created a waiver of sovereign immunity. 
C Self-Government as a Normative Paradigm 
The United States policy of self-determination has two sources - the 
fundamental situation of Indian tribes in the constitutional system in Worcester, 
and the federal economic legislation of the last 30 years that has given tribes 
control over funding, allowing them to provide services for their citizens and 
develop their economies. The US has not legislated very much to make tribal 
jurisdiction definite, but has let the Supreme Court elucidate the position. The 
few jurisdictional laws passed have reversed policies of state control and 
restored jurisdiction over non-member Indians.347 
In contrast, the Canadian federal and provincial governments have 
been active in legislating for First Nations self-government. With no sovereign 
recognition paradigm to utilise, First Nations jurisdiction has been negotiated 
and legislated for in fine detail. Because of this, First Nations self-government 
may be seen as a possible end to the US Supreme Court's gradual curtailment of 
343 PG McHugh "Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and Australasia" in PG 
McHugh and Ken S Coates Living Relationships, Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the 
New Millennium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 154. 
344 Dodge v Nakai (1969) 298 F Supp 26, 31-32 (D Ariz.), Wounded Head v Tribal Council of 
Oglala Sioux Tribe (1975) 507 F 2d 1079, 1082-84 (8th Cir), Brown v United States (1973) 486 
F 2d 658 (8th Cir); Slattery v Arapahoe Tribal Council ( 1971) 453 F 2d 278 ( 10th Cir). See 
Robert J Mccarthy "Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The lndian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years" 
(1998) 34 Idaho L Rev 465,472. 
345 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez (1978) 436 US 49 (SC). 
346 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez ( 1978) 436 US 49, 58 (SC). 
347 See Duro v Reina (1990) 495 US 676,679 (SC); The Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians Act 
( 1991) 25 USC § 1301(2) affirmed the "inherent power of Indian tribes .. . to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over all Indians." 
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Native American sovereignty. Put another way, Canada has legislated to give 
the maximum indigenous autonomy that is consistent with many conceptions of 
liberalism, and the United States is slowly pulling Native American sovereignty 
down to that level. 
In light of this, despite nominal and historical differences, the basic paradigm 
of indigenous autonomy embodied by these governmental policies is the same. 
It is a paradigm that acknowledges the justice in indigenous demands for 
autonomy, and seeks to reconcile these demands with the liberal paradigm of 
justice that generally dominates in these two countries. Both governments see 
indigenous autonomy as an essential aspect of the economic and cultural 
wellbeing of their citizens.348 This may be seen as part of a new 'pluralism' 
paradigm in liberal politics.349 
VII INDIGENOUS AUTONOMY AND LIBERALISM 
There is a fundamental tension in the contemporary paradigms of 
indigenous autonomy between tribalism350 and constitutionalism (also known as 
civic republicanism)351 • The Western conception of justice that exists in most 
democracies is dominated by liberalism. Justice is embodied in equal individual 
rights and individual autonomy.352 With the dominance of liberalism has come 
unease with notions of community responsibility, tribalism and group rights. 353 
Indeed, some commentators have attacked the separate and autonomous status 
348 Tsosie suggests that the notion of overlapping spheres of power is consistent with the 
political power divisions in the American (and by implication, Canadian) federal systems: 
Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 398. 
349 Dalia Tsuk argues that historical federal Indian law exhibited a high degree of legal 
pluralism, and that much of it was aimed at establishing a plural polity: Dalia Tsuk "The New 
Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism" 2001 29 Fla St UL R 189, 189-199. 
350 Tsosie defines 'tribalism' as " the efforts of indigenous groups to define their political and 
cultural identity as separate from that of the larger nation- state" Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, 
Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous Peoples fit within Civil 
Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 359. 
351 Tsosie defines 'constitutionalism' as the process whereby "nation-states that possess a 
constitutional democracy [define] the terms under which citizens relate to one another within an 
overall "civil society."" Tsosie, above, 359. 
352 Rebecca Tsosie "Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of 
Justice Thurgood Marshall 's Indian Law Jurisprudence" (1994) 26 Ariz St LJ 495, 530. 
353 Tsosie, above, 530. 
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of tribes as defeating civil rights by rejecting "the teaching on natural rights 
which lies at the heart of the American regime."354 "Many non-Indians, 
instructed from childhood that "all Americans are equal," view the unique right 
of tribes to govern their reservations as clear evidence that Indians have "more 
rights" than non-Indians."355 This section furthers the analysis of the previous 
section by examining the relationship between indigenous autonomy and 
liberalism. This section identifies arguments for and against indigenous 
autonomy and differentiated rights in liberal philosophy. It then examines in 
detail the judicial examinations of indigenous autonomy that many have argued 
are greatly influenced by liberal philosophy. 
A Liberal PoliJical Philosophy and Indigenous Autonomy 
Liberal political theory is generally concerned with abstract theories of 
just constitutional orders that do not address social and historical imperatives 
such as indigenous difference.356 The key concern for the liberal critique of 
indigenous autonomy is citizenship, which has taken on prime importance in 
liberal theory partly because of the multicultural citizenship debates.357 The 
liberal concern about citizenship and indigenous autonomy can be shaped into 
two main themes - the general liberal concern for equal rights and obligations 
and the civic republican concern that citizens should have a shared political 
identity and community. 
1 Equal rights and obligations 
354 Robert C Jeffrey, Jr "The Indian Civil Rights Act and the Martinez Decision: A 
Reconsideration" (1990) 35 SD L Rev 355,370; quoted in Tsosie, above, 531. 
355 David H Getches, Charles F Wilkinson, and Robert A Williams Cases and Materials 011 
Federal Indian Law (3 ed, West Publishing Co., St Paul, Minnesota, 1993) 459. For examples of 
the extreme actions some citizens take when they believe that equal rights are being 
compromised, see Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of 
Nebraska Press, Lincoln & London, 1998) 316-317. 
356 Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 24-25. 
357 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman 'Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, 
Contexts, Concepts' in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 5. 
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Orthodox liberal citizenship is characterised by equality of individual 
rights. 358 No group or individual should have special cultural rights, because 
rights are non-discriminatory, universal and negative.359 The US Constitution's 
'equal protection' clause is an example of this ideal of equality.360 Thus, liberal-
democrats see indigenous autonomy and self-government rights as a loss of 
equal citizenship status,361 and this view promotes assimilation of Indians' 
rights with the rights of other citizens.362 Indigenous autonomy and other rights 
usually involve differentiated citizenship, granting membership or rights that are 
not available to other citizens.363 Some people regard any form of differentiated 
rights as detrimental to citizenship.364 The concept of 'citizenship' is generally 
regarded as implying a universality of citizenship "in the sense that citizenship 
status transcends particularity and difference." 365 
2 Shared political community 
The liberal ideal of a shared moral and political community is 
associated with a form of liberalism labelled as civic republicanism (or 
sometimes constitutionalism). Under civic republicanism, a nation is seen as a 
collection of individual citizens that have a sense of belonging to a single 
political community.366 The United States is thus seen as single political 
community based on shared goals ideals and universal principles: liberty, 
358 Andrew Vincent Nationality and Particularity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2002) 85; Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman 'Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: 
Issues, Contexts, Concepts' in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 31. 
359 Andrew Vincent Nationalism and Particularity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2002) 173. 
360 US Constitution, amendment XIV§ l: " ... no state shall ... deny any person within its 
{urisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
61 Kymlicka and Norman, above, 31. 
362 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 359. See also Patrick Macklem 
"Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples" ( 1993) 45 STNLR 1311. 
363 Kymlicka and Norman, above, 31. 
364 Kymlicka and Norman, above, 31. 
365 Iris Marion Young 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship' in Roland Beiner (ed) Theorizing Citizenship (State University of New York Press, 
Albany, New York, 1995) 175 
366 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples lit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 367. 
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equality and republicanism.367 This notion in turn strengthens national 
citizenship identity.368 In the last fifteen years a 'culture war' has been fought 
against the diversity of multiculturalism.369 Nathan Glazer exemplifies the 
opposition to multiculturalism.370 Glazer argues that ethnic and racial bases 
should not divide the common culture, that ethnic and racial affiliation should 
be voluntary and separate from state and public authority, and that United States 
citizens should accept American identity as central and ethnic identity as 
peripheral.
371 
Furthermore, the liberty of these individual citizens and the 
community is dependent on the maintenance of appropriate virtues of 
citizenship.
372 
There is a general view that virtues and identities of citizens are 
important and independent factors of democratic government.373 These virtues 
must be fostered by the political community. The common moral and political 
community sustains civil society. 374 Civic republicanism insists that citizenship 
identity should be each individual's primary identity.375 Therefore, civic 
republicans regret every social division, and seek a common community that 
shares a goal of a common future. 376 
B Indigenous Autonomy at the Limits of Liberalism 
367 Nathan Glazer We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., I 997) 99-100. 
368 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 367. 
369 Robert Schmuhl "America and Multiculturalism" in Michael Dunne and Tiziano Bonazzi 
Citizenship and Rights in Multicultural Societies (Keele University Press, Keele, Staffordshire, 
1995) 141-143. 
370 Glazer argues that multiculturalism in the United States "is the price America is paying for 
its inability or unwillingness to incorporate into its society African Americans". Nathan Glazer 
We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997) 147. 
371 Glazer, above, 159. 
372 Barry Hindess 'Multiculturalism and Citizenship' in Chandran Kukathas (ed) Multicultural 
Citizens: The Philosophy and Politics of Identity (The Centre for Independent Studies, St 
Leonards, 1993) 35; Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman 'Citizenship in Culturally Diverse 
Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts' in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds) Citizenship 
in Diverse Societies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 6. 
373 Kymlicka and Norman, 7. 
374 Barry Hindess 'Multiculturalism and Citizenship' in Chandran Kukathas (ed) Multicultural 
Citizens: The Philosophy and Politics of Identity (The Centre for Independent Studies, St 
Leonards, 1993) 36: civil society is "a sphere of social interaction, not directly controlled by 
fovernment, in which citizens engage with others and discuss matters of general concern". 
75 Kymlicka and Norman 34. 
376 Iris Marion Young 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship' in Roland Beiner (ed) Theorizing Citizenship (State University of New York Press, 
Albany, New York, 1995) 182. 
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This section highlights various arguments that visions of liberalism 
have guided the US Supreme Court's decisions in cases that involved tribal 
sovereignty and individual liberty and citizenship. In contrast to the large 
literature surrounding this issue in the United States, there is a relative dearth of 
material discussing the situation in Canada. This section will try to fill in the 
gap somewhat. 
I United States 
As seen above, 377 the current paradigm of indigenous autonomy in the 
United States has seen the gradual diminishment of tribal sovereignty to a level 
characterised by the courts as 'self-government'. This diminishment has taken 
place in a situation of constitutional indeterminacy, and, as such, scholars have 
strongly argued that liberal ideals have influenced the court's decisions. 378 
There are four clear areas of concern for the courts:379 democratic deficit of 
tribal governments, the ethno-racial basis of tribal membership, the importance 
of citizenship, and lack of consent to jurisdiction. There is, however, one 
significant source of reconciliation of tribalism and liberalism in the 
characterisation of tribes as political entities rather than racial groupings. 
(a) Democratic deficit 
Thomas Aleinikoff identifies a perceived democratic deficit in that 
large numbers of non-Indians live on tribal reservations, but are not eligible to 
377 See section VB. 
378 Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and 
American Citizenship (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002); Ann 
Tweedy "The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and Debasement of 
Tribal Sovereignty" (2000) 18 Buff Pub Int L J 147; Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, 
Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous Peoples fit within Civil 
Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357. 
379 Aleinikoff states that "[t]or the Court, Indian sovereignty represents devolution to a racial or 
ethnic group; it is multiculturalism with political power. As such, it undercuts an individualistic, 
non-race-based constitutionalism that lies at the heart of much of the current Court's work - a 
core concept of which ... is citizenship. Citizenship provides a nonethnic, nonracial basis for 
commonality, and it suggests the possession of individual rights and a guarantee of equality 
before the law." - Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, 
the State, and American Citizenship (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
2002) 118. 
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vote in tribal elections, run for tribal office or serve on tribal juries.380 He uses 
the Supreme Court's analysis in Duro v Reina381 to support this argument, citing 
the Court's observations that non-members could not become a member of the 
tribe, vote, hold office, or serve on a jury.382 Permanent disenfranchisement of 
members is the central problem, especially when this is contrasted with the 
immediate enfranchisement of citizens who move into new states.383 To 
Aleinikoff, "[t]he idea of a class of residents permanently excluded from 
political participation is clearly of concern to the Court."384 In contrast 
Aleinikoff notes that such membership rules are consistent with views of tribes 
as nations. 385 The Courts conceptualisation seems to be that tribes are voluntary 
organizations whose power over members rests on consent.386 
(b) Ethno-racial basis of tribal membership 
Tribal membership rules are primarily blood-based.387 This ethno-
racial basis for membership has no parallel in sub-national political 
communities in the United States.388 Aleinikoff argues that the Supreme Court 
sees Indian sovereignty as a devolution of power to an ethnic or racial group 
that undercuts non-racial and non-ethnic citizenship.389 Although the Courts 
have not recently objected to these issues (as this would indict much federal 
Indian law), Aleinikoff has suggested that culture-based arguments against 
tribal jurisdiction in Duro v Reina are evidence of this approach. 390 Tweedy 
observes that the formal equality aspect of liberalism embodied in the equal 
protection clause "equates racial preferences for subordinated groups with racist 
380 Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and 
American Citizenship (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002) 115. See 
also Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do 
Indigenous Peoples fit within Civil Society'' (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 380. 
381 Dura v Reina (1990) 495 US 676 (SC). 
382 Dura v Reina (1990) 495 US 676, 688 (SC). 
383 Aleinikoff, above, 116, citing US Constitution, amendment XIV. 
384 Aleinikoff, above, 116. 
385 Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and 
American Citizenship (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002) 116. 
386 Aleinikoff, above, 116 citing Dura v Reina (1990) 495 US 676,693 (SC). 
387 Aleinikoff, above, 117. 
388 Aleinikoff, above, 117. 
389 Aleinikoff, above, 118. 
390 Aleinikoff, above, 117-118. 
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actions perpetrated by members of the dominant group. "391 She argues against 
applying this reasoning to Indian tribes, because tribes are not racial groups but 
political entities.392 
(c) Importance of citizenship and citizenship rights 
Equal rights and a unified political community are embodied in 
identical citizenship in civic republican liberalism. The third concern of the 
Supreme Court identified by Aleinikoff is the importance of citizenship;393 
similarly, Tsosie notes that notions of citizenship are an important part of the 
liberal critique of indigenous autonomy.394 Furthermore, Tsosie argues that the 
Supreme Court's recent incursions into tribal sovereignty are based on 
safeguarding non-Indian rights.395 Aleinikoff again uses Duro v Reina to make 
his argument, citing the Court's concern that "Whatever might be said of the 
historical record, we must view it in light of petitioner's status as a citizen of the 
United States. "396 Aleinikoff argues that because Duro was a citizen, he was 
protected against "unwarranted intrusions" on his personal liberty, and criminal 
trial and punishment was "so serious an intrusion on personal liberty that its 
exercise over non-Indian citizens was a power necessarily surrendered by the 
tribes in their submission to the overriding sovereignty of the United States."397 
Aleinikoff also argues that the democratic deficit undercuts the ideal of equal 
391 Ann Tweedy "The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and Debasement 
of Tribal Sovereignty" (2000) 18 Buff Pub Int LI 147,212. 
392 Ann Tweedy, above, 212; see also Morton v Mancari (1974) 417 US 535 (SC). 
393 Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitutio11, the State, and 
America11 Citizenship (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002) 118. 
394 Rebecca Tsosie ''Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357 359. '"'dual citizenship" justifies 
certain "special" rights, which distinguish indigenous people from citizens belonging to other 
cultural groups. This engenders resentment among non-Indian citizens, who associate such 
rights with "affirmative action" and argue that all citizens should have the same rights as 
"equals" under the Constitution". 
395 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 383. See also the similar 
arguments in Ann Tweedy "The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and 
Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty" (2000) 18 Buff Pub Int LI 147, 210-216. 
396 Dura v Reina (1990) 495 US 676,692 (SC); see also Robert N Clinton "There is No Federal 
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes (2002) 34 Ariz St L J 113, 223-224. 
397 Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitutio11, the State, and 
American Citizenship (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002) 119, citng 
Duro v Reina (1990) 495 US 676, 692-693 (SC). 
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citizenship.
398 
The Court's reluctance to grant tribal jurisdiction may be 
underscored by the fact that tribal court decisions are not generally subject to 
federal review.399 
(d) Non-member consent 
Tsosie notes that one of the objections to tribal jurisdiction is that "they 
never consented to such governance merely by accepting homestead rights 
under the federal government's public land policies."400 The Supreme Court's 
decision in Strate v A-1 Contractors40 ' gives legal affirmation to these 
objections. The Court looked for actual consent to jurisdiction in the governing 
contract,
402 
and Ann Tweedy points out the importance of consent in the 
decision many other jurisdictional decisions involving Native American 
governments and non-Indians.403 Tweedy criticises the Supreme Court's search 
for actual consent to be bound because this is impossible to reconcile with the 
social contract theory that the Court is applying, and because actual consent is 
"a much more stringent requirement than the Court is willing to impose on our 
own state and federal governments in determining the reach of their 
jurisdiction. "404 
(e) Political communities 
398 Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and 
American Citizenship (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002) 119. 
399 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez (1978) 436 US 49 (SC); see above section VB 3 b. 
400 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 380. 
401 Strate v A-1 Contractors (1997) 520 US 438 (SC). 
402 Strate v A-1 Contractors (1997) 520 US 438, 457 (SC). 
403 Ann Tweedy "The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and Debasement 
of Tribal Sovereignty" (2000) 18 Buff Pub Int LJ 147,208: citing Montana v United States 
( 1981) 450 US 544, 566 (SC); Brendale v Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian 
Nation (1989) 492 US 408, 445 (SC); Duro v Reina (1990) 495 US 676, 679 and 688 (SC); 
Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) 435 US 191, 193-94 (SC). 
404 Ann Tweedy "The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court 's Divestment and Debasement 
of Tribal Sovereignty'' (2000) 18 Buff Pub lnt LJ 147, 208. Tweedy continues by stating that it 
is " unfair for the Court to enforce a more stringent conception of Western justice on Indian 
tribes than it is willing to enforce upon the rest of the nation.": Tweedy, above, 208. 
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'Equal protection' is an area where difficulties arise in reconciling the 
constitutional rights of citizens and the right of tribes and their members.405 One 
way that the Courts have been able to reconcile differential treatment of Native 
Americans is through characterizing the term 'Indians' as signifying a historical 
category applied to relations between political units (the government and tribes) 
instead of a racial category.406 The history of treaty-making and much 
legislation is predicated on the "status of tribal governments as distinct political, 
rather than merely racial, entities."407 In United States v Antelope408 the 
Supreme Court interpreted this special status as justifying the differential 
treatment of Indians from non- Indians.409 Morton v Mancan410 applied the 
rational basis scrutiny to these political classifications, rather applying the more 
strict scrutiny given to racial classifications.411 These interpretations allow the 
federal government's to continue to make special laws for tribes and their 
members without violating the Constitution's equal protection limitations.412 
2 Canada: Applying the United States Arguments 
The literature that discusses US liberal concerns with indigenous 
autonomy is not replicated in Canadian journals. However, the recent cases 
concerning self-government do provide examples from which similar concerns 
can be seen. 
(a) Political concerns about self-government 
There has been much political concern about the stgnmg of self-
government agreements and the instituting of First Nations governments. Many 
405 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 394. 
406 PG McHugh "Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and Australasia" in PG 
McHugh and Ken S Coates Living Relationships, Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the 
New Millennium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 150. 
407 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 394. 
408 United States v Antelope, ( 1977) 430 US 641 (SC). 
409 United States v Antelope, (1977) 430 US 641, 647-49 (SC). 
410 Morton v Mancari (1974) 417 US 535 (SC). 
411 Morton v Mancari (1974) 417 US 535,553 n 24 (SC). 
412 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 394. 
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LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
of the arguments mirror those identified above in relation to Native American 
government. In the mid-1980s, Sally Weaver argued that the Canadian 
government's resistance to aboriginal rights demands was its "steadfast 
commitment to liberal democratic ideology", that stressed formal equality, 
individualism and freedom from discrimination.413 Indigenous rights are 
generally seen as discriminatory against non-indigenous Canadians.414 Opinion 
pieces in newspapers also emphasise the illiberal nature of self-government 
agreements. A Calgary Herald reporter saw Nisga'a-style self-government as 
creating "privileged franchises for self-defined ethnic groups with questionable 
provenance who already get excessive and unjustifiable special entitlements out 
of the public purse."415 Thus, the concerns of any liberal democratic Canadian 
government with Aboriginal rights are differentiated legal and administrative 
regimes based on special status, collective rights and cultural uniqueness.416 
(b) Self-government in the Courts 
Despite the Canadian federal government's acknowledgement of the 
inherent right of self-government in the 1995 Federal Policy guide,417 the 
Canadian judiciary has not found a right to general self-government. In R v 
Pamajewon418 the Supreme Court found that the Eagle Lake First Nation did not 
have the broad right to self-government, including the regulation of economic 
conduct and gambling.419 Lamer CJ assumed, but did not decide, that self-
government claims fall within section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.420 He 
413 Sally Weaver "Federal Difficulties with Aboriginal Rights Demands" in Menno Boldt and J 
Anthony Long The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985) 142. 
414 See Robert Spaulding "Peoples as National Minorities: A Review of Will Kymlicka's 
Arguments For Aboriginal Rights from a Self-Determination Perspective" (1997) 47 U Toronto 
L J 35, 44 n 66. 
415 Diane Francis "Rip up the Nisga deal before it's too late" Calgary Herald, December 12 
1999, E5. 
416 Weaver, above, 142. 
417 Canada Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government The Government of Canada's 
Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-
Government (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, 1995). 
418 R v Pamajewon [1996] 2 SCR 821 (SCC). 
419 R v Pamajewon [1996] 2 SCR 821 (SCC); see Kent McNeil "Aboriginal Rights in Canada: 
From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty" 5 Tulsa J Comp & Int'l L 253,281 ; Patrick 
Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto, 2001) 173. 
420 R v Pamajewon [ 1996) 2 SCR 821, 832 (SCC). 
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stated that these claims were no different than other rights claimed under section 
35 (such as hunting, fishing, and land rights), and thus must be proved under the 
same standard, the Van Der Peet test.421 This test defined Aboriginal rights as 
"an element of a custom, practice or tradition integral to the distinctive culture 
of an Aboriginal nation."422 The Court rejected the broad self-government 
categorisation of the right claimed, and formulated the claim as "the right to 
participate in, and to regulate, high stakes gambling activities on the 
reservation. "423 
Subsequently, in Delgamuukw v British Columbia424 the Supreme 
Court found that the trial judge's errors made judgement on self-government 
rights impossible.425 Lamer CJ found that the complexity of the issues and the 
lack of adequate submissions on them meant that this was not "the right case for 
the Court to lay down the legal principles to guide future litigation" on self-
government.426 However, Patrick Macklem sees Delgamuukw as furthering the 
possibilities for judicial recognition of self-government rights, because it 
contemplates self-government over economic regulation that is unrelated to 
traditional land use.427 
In Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General/28 the opposition 
leader in British Columbia challenged the legality of the Nisga'a self-
government agreement. In his argument, he included a reference to the Charter 
right to vote in legislative elections.429 The British Columbia Supreme Court 
countered these arguments with other examples where citizens cannot vote for 
the institution that enacts laws applicable to them.430 The British Columbia 
42 1 R v Pamajewon [ 1996] 2 SCR 821 , 832-833 (SCC). 
422 Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 173. 
423 R v Pamajewon [ 1996] 2 SCR 821, 833 (SCC). 
424 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [ 1997] 3 SCR 1010 (SCC). 
425 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 1114 (SCC). 
426 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 1114 (SCC). 
427 Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 174. 
428 Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] 189 DLR (4th) 333. 
429 Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] 189 DLR (4th) 333 para 12 (SCC) 
43° Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] 189 DLR (4th) 333 para 159-160 
(SCC). 
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Supreme Court held, that the aboriginal right to self-government was extant.431 
It is interesting that the 'Marshall trilogy' was discussed,432 and the Court 
concluded that the discussion of self-government must take into account the 
recognition of political communities with diminished powers.433 
The Canadian judiciary has taken a conservative approach to 
indigenous autonomy in the form of self-government rights under section 35(1) 
of the Canadian constitution.434 There is clearly indeterminacy in these 
constitutional rights, and it is clearly not the court's intention to jump boldly 
into constitutional deliberations that would give First Nations self-government 
rights that would invalidate the application of federal and provincial laws. 
(c) Guarantees of Citizenship Rights in Self-Government 
Agreements 
The Canadian federal government has taken steps at every stage to 
ensure that indigenous autonomy complies with liberalism, given the 
accusations that self-government agreements are undemocratic, institute race-
based governments, and infringe equality by giving First Nations special 
rights. 435 Therefore, all the three areas of concern identified by Aleinikoff -
democratic deficit, ethno-racial basis of membership and importance of 
citizenship - are also of concern to the Canadian government, and this is 
reflected in the terms of the self-government agreements. The Federal Policy 
Guide on Self-government of 1995 states that the Canadian government 
"committed to the principle that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
should bind all governments in Canada".436 Self-government agreements have 
431 Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] 189 DLR (4th) 333 para 137 
(SCC). 
432 Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] 189 DLR (4th) 333 para 88-96 
(SCC). 
433 Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] 189 DLR (4th) 333 para 95 (SCC). 
434 Constitution Act 1982, s 35(1) (Canada Act 1982 (UK), sch B). 
435 Mary C Hurley The Nisga'a Final Agreement (Parliamentary Research Branch, Ottawa, 
200 I) available at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb992-e.htrn> 
436 Canada Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government The Government of Canada 's 
Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-
Government (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, 1995): "The 
Government is committed to the principle that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
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to provide that the Charter applies to all First Nations government actions.437 
The British Columbia Treaty Commission Annual Report 2002438 is sensitive to 
these issues. It points out that full Nisga'a control over laws is limited to areas 
that affect non-members very minimally, and that Nisga'a control over areas 
that do impact on non-members is subject to minimum standards.439 The fact 
that Nisga'a government must be democratic is stressed at Iength.440 Also 
stressed are the rights of residents of lands that are strongly protected by the 
Nisga'a treaty.441 The Federal Policy Guide states that if non-members are to be 
regulated, then measures must be put in place for their input into decisions, as 
well as rights of redress.442 Further, it makes it clear that the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms applies to First Nations governments and their actions.443 This is 
exemplified by the Nisga'a Final Agreement, which stipulates that the Charter 
will apply to the Nisga'a government.444 
There has been debate about applying the Charter to self-governments, 
with the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples identifying the liberal 
concern that "it would be highly anomalous if Canadian citizens enjoyed the 
protection of the Charter in their relations with every government in Canada 
should bind all governments in Canada, so that Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal 
Canadians alike may continue to enjoy equally the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Charter.". 
437 Canada Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government The Government of Canada's 
Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-
Government (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, 1995). 
438 British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) Annual Report 2002:The Changing 
Landscape (British Columbia Treaty Commission, Vancouver, 2002). 
439 BCTC Annual Report 2002, above, 20. 
440 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Nisga 'a Final Agreement Issue Paper No 19 (available 
at <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/pdf/isspap_e.pdf> : "In summary, Nisga'a 
Government will be a democratic government which, despite its character as an aboriginal 
government, will be quite recognizable as a local government compatible with other local 
fovernments in Canada." 
41 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Nisga'a Final Agreement Issue Paper No 19 (available 
at <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/pdf/isspap_e. pdf> 19 .3. 
442 Canada Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government The Government of Canada's 
Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-
Government (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, 1995).: "Where the 
exercise of Aboriginal jurisdiction or authority over non-members is contemplated, agreements 
must provide for the establishment of mechanisms through which non-members may have input 
into decisions that will affect their rights and interests, and must provide for rights of redress." 
443 British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) Annual Report 2002:The Changing 
Landscape (British Columbia Treaty Commission, Vancouver, 2002) 21. 
444 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 2 art 9. Patrick Macklem Indigenous 
Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 201. 
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except for Aboriginal Governments."445 The Royal Commission also noted the 
converse view that "some Charter provisions [ ... ] could hamper and even stifle 
the efforts of Aboriginal nations to revive and strengthen their cultures and 
traditions. As such, the Charter might operate as the unwitting servant of the 
forces of assimilation and domination."446 Additionally, Patrick Macklem 
identifies the argument that "the Charter, premised on liberal values of 
individual autonomy and freedom, threatens Aboriginal forms of social 
organization premised on collective values of community and responsibility."447 
The citizenship-right issue of trying non-members in the courts of 
indigenous governments is clearly of concern in Canada. The Nisga'a treaty 
provides that where a person may receive a sentence of imprisonment under 
Nisga'a law, they may elect to be tried in the British Columbian courts.448 
Furthermore, Nisga'a courts cannot impose a penalty different in nature from 
those imposed in the provincial and federal courts on a non-citizen without their 
consent.
449 
Appeals of Nisga'a court decisions can also be taken to the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia.450 
Another example of the primacy placed on uniform citizenship rights is 
seen in the proposed First Nations Governance Act (FNGA). Section 42 would 
repeal section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, which currently exempts 
the decisions of band councils made pursuant to provisions of the Indian Act 
from the application.451 The FNGA attempts to soften this by providing that "the 
needs and aspirations of the aboriginal community affected by the complaint, to 
445 C ES Franks "Rights and Self-government for Canada's Aboriginal Peoples" in Aboriginal 
Rights and Self-government: The Canadian and Mexican Experience i11 North American 
Perspective (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal & Kingston, 2000) 121. 
446 Franks, above, 121-122. 
447 Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 200 l) 194. Macklem himself concludes that "the Charter does pose a 
risk to the continued vitality of indigenous difference. The Charter enables litigants to 
constitutionally interrogate the rich complexity of Aboriginal societies according to a rigid 
analytical grid of individual right and state obligation. It authorizes the judicial reorganization of 
Aboriginal societies according to non-Aboriginal values." Macklem, above, 195. 
448 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 12 art 43. 
449 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 12 art 44. 
450 Nisga'a Final Agreement Act RSBC 1999 c C-2, eh 12 art 45-48. 
451 First Nations Governance Bill, Bill C-7 2nd Session, 37th Parliament, 51 Elizabeth II, 2002, 
section 42. 
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the extent consistent with principles of gender equality, shall be taken into 
account" in interpreting and applying the Canadian Human Rights Act.452 
( d) The Charlottetown accord 
The Charlottetown Accord emerged out of a series of constitutional 
conferences between aboriginal leaders and first ministers of the provinces,453 
and proposed major changes to the relationships between aboriginal peoples and 
the provincial and federal governments. A statement that Aboriginal peoples 
have "the inherent right to self-government within Canada" would have been 
added to section 35 of the Constitution Act.454 A 'third order' aboriginal 
jurisdiction for Canada would sit alongside the provincial and federal orders of 
Canadian government.455 
Disappointingly for First Nations groups, the Accord was defeated by 
the nation-wide constitutional referendum456 that was part of the arduous 
amendment provisions of the constitution, which required agreement of all ten 
provincial legislatures as well as the federal Parliament.457 The referendum 
defeat shows that the majority of Canadian citizens do not support the 
constitutional recognition and protection of the inherent right of self-
government for First Nations peoples. 
C Reconciling Indigenous Autonomy with Liberalism 
Rebecca Tsosie recently asked whether indigenous political identity 
can be reconciled with the civic republican unitary construction of civil society 
452 First Nations Governance Bill, s 41. 
453 Alan C Cairns Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (University of 
British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2000) 80-81. 
454 C ES Franks "Rights and Self-government for Canada's Aboriginal Peoples" in Aboriginal 
Rights and Self-government: The Canadian and Mexican Experience in North American 
Perspective (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal & Kingston, 2000) 116. 
455 Patrick Maddern Indigenous Difference and the Constitution (University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto, 2001) 178. 
456 Franks, above, 116. 
457 C ES Franks "Rights and Self-government for Canada's Aboriginal Peoples" in Aboriginal 
Rights and Self-government: The Canadian and Mexican Experience in North American 
Perspective (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal & Kingston, 2000) 118. 
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and common citizenship.458 Similarly, in recent years many liberal theorists 
have grappled with the justice of indigenous rights and autonomy. Some have 
concluded that indigenous rights and autonomy must be recognised in any 
coherent liberal theory of justice concerning multicultural societies. This 
reconciliation of indigenous rights and autonomy and liberalism takes three 
main forms personal autonomy-based equality, rejection of civic 
republicanism, and recourse to the 'means of incorporation'. It is acknowledged 
that indigenous peoples often present arguments for autonomy that do not seek 
to reconcile their demands with liberalism, but this paper's scope demands a 
focus on liberal arguments, for it is these arguments that will be most persuasive 
in liberal discourse. 
1 Indigenous autonomy and liberal equality 
Indigenous autonomy seems to defeat the liberal ideal of equal 
citizenship by applying different laws, rights, and governance regimes to 
indigenous people. Will Kymlicka rejects these arguments in a way that is of 
critical importance in the indigenous rights debate occurring in liberal 
democracies.459 On a practical level, Kymlicka see the view that minority rights 
conflicts with the concept of citizenship as untenable, as virtually every 
democracy recognises some form of group-differentiated citizenship.460 
Kymlicka's philosophical argument, contra civic republican 
conceptions of 'special' indigenous rights but consistent with his liberal 
approach, is based on equality. The concept of equality identified is 'equal 
45 8 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 398. 
459 See Richard Spaulding "Peoples as National Minorities: A Review of Will Kymlicka's 
Arguments For Aboriginal Rights from a Self-Determination Perspective" (1997) 47 U Toronto 
L J 35, 36. One reason for this is that "Kymlicka is a listener and bridge-builder in a discourse in 
which cultural dissonance can be sharp, and in which the imbalance of power between the 
interests involved invites an oppositional dynamic." Spaulding, above, 36-37. This article is an 
excellent analysis of the potency of Kymlicka' s liberal arguments against orthodox liberal 
attacks on indigenous autonomy and rights. 
460 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman 'Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, 
Contexts, Concepts' in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 31; Examples of this are tribal sovereignty 
and affirmative action programmes in the United States, indigenous self-government and French 
language policy in Canada, and Maori Parliamentary representation and Treaty rights in New 
Zealand. 
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concern and respect' rather than equal treatment in every case.461 Kymlicka sets 
out two major claims that underlie a liberal defence of minority rights: "that 
individual freedom is tied in some important way to membership in one's 
national group; and that group-specific rights can promote equality between the 
minority and the majority."462 
Kymlicka sees indigenous peoples are 'national minorities' that should 
be able to maintain themselves as a distinct culture, if they so choose.463 The 
liberal 'good' of cultural membership should thus be equally protected and 
supported by the government for all 'national minority' groups within a 
country.
464 In democracies, the majority has the legislative power to protect its 
own cultural interests, and national minorities should have the same opportunity 
to protect their cultures.465 Group differentiated self-government rights allow 
indigenous peoples to remedy their 'systemic disadvantage in the cultural 
marketplace', in order to achieve true equality,466 and to prevent ongoing 
stigmatisation and disadvantages. 467 Patrick Macklem has indicated support for 
this comprehensive theory of justice in multicultural societies that requires the 
state to allow people to choose their own plan and concept of the good life: 
these choices occur in the context of a person's culture.468 He states that 
"[c]onstitutional recognition of the value of Aboriginal cultural difference 
461 Richard Spaulding "Peoples as National Minorities: A Review of Will Kymlicka's 
Arguments For Aboriginal Rights from a Self-Determination Perspective" (1997) 47 U Toronto 
L J 35, 38 
462 Will Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford University Press, Oxford, I 995) 52. 
463 Kymlicka, above, 49 and I 13. 
464 Kymlicka I 13. This view of culture as necessary for meaningful individual choice is 
supported by Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada 
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 71 . 
465 Kymlicka, above, I 13. 
466 "Hence group-differentiated self-government rights compensate for unequal circumstances 
which put the members of minority cultures at a systemic disadvantage in the cultural 
marketplace, regardless of their personal choices in life. This is one of many areas in which true 
equality requires not identical treatment, but rather differential treatment in order to 
accommodate differential needs." Kymlicka, above, 113. 
467 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman 'Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, 
Contexts, Concepts' in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 33. 
468 Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 200 I) 72. 
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furthers equality by distributing protection of cultural interests to those who 
otherwise lack the resources necessary for cultural reproduction."469 
Kymlicka's equality argument is the most complete foil to the 
discrimination charge against indigenous autonomy rights, as it enlists 
individual equality in its cause: "Kymlicka assures Canadians that they need not 
choose between support for equality and Aboriginal rights because both sets of 
rights represent the same basic principle of liberal justice."470 In this way, 
Kymlicka offers liberal democracies a liberal philosophical basis for indigenous 
autonomy arrangements. 
2 Indigenous autonomy and civic republicanism 
Indigenous autonomy seems to conflict with civic republicanism, as it 
is directly concerned with legitimising cultural identities that are distinct from 
common citizenship identities.471 However, Tsosie questions the assumption 
that states' civil structures are harmed by the presence of separate groups, and 
that thus states should not promote ethnic rights, as they impede the goal of 
common citizenship.472 By legitimising indigenous cultural identity amongst 
groups comprising around 1 to 3 per cent of the population (in the case of the 
United States and Canada),473 there is still an overwhelming majority that can 
belong more fully to the wider political community. Furthermore, indigenous 
self-government may be the best way for the state to compromise and 
accommodate the aspirations of alienated indigenous groups, and in this way 
encourage them to identify with the state, and thus enhance common citizenship 
469 Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 200 l) 74. 
470 Richard Spaulding "Peoples as National Minorities: A Review of Will Kymlicka' s 
Arguments For Aboriginal Rights from a Self-Determination Perspective" (1997) 47 U Toronto 
L J 35, 45. 
471 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman 'Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, 
Contexts, Concepts' in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 35. 
472 Rebecca Tsosie "Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism: Where do Indigenous 
Peoples fit within Civil Society" (2003) 5 U Pa J Const L 357, 399. 
473 Roger L Nichols Indians in the United States and Canada (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln & London, 1998) 323. 
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identity.
474 
In this vein, James Tully argues that Aboriginal self-government is 
not incompatible with civic republican individual equality and rights.475 
The virtue of civic republicanism has also been questioned. Tully 
argues that the notion that the unity of political association requires uniformity 
of culture as an anachronism.476 Iris Marion Young argues that that public life 
should not encourage the abandonment of particular group identities, because 
this desire for unity "does not eliminate differences and tends to exclude some 
perspectives from the public."477 Instead of universal citizenship, societies must 
have group-differentiated citizenship in order to ensure that existing inequality 
and group oppression can be ameliorated through recognition and representation 
of oppressed groups.478 Political principles cannot be developed from the 
assumption of a just society, but must start from the actual social and historic 
context.
479 
Theories of citizenship must start from the assumption of 
differentiated humanity, with actual or potential group oppression or 
disadvantage. 480 
In contrast, Richard Dagger, an advocate of civic republicanism, 
criticises Young on two counts - that it is difficult to identify 'oppressed 
474 
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman 'Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, 
Contexts, Concepts' in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 37. 
475 James Tully "A Just Relationship between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Peoples of 
Canada" in Curtis Cook and Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government 
(McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 2000) 69. "the mutual recognition of and respect 
for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples as equal, coexisting and self-governing peoples 
provides the conditions for equality of civic participation and individual freedom in a culturally 
diverse society." 
476 Tully, above, 69. 
477 Iris Marion Young 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship' in Roland Beiner (ed) Theorizing Citizenship (State University of New York Press, 
Albany, New York, 1995) 184. For Young's general critique of universality and impartiality see 
Iris Marion Young Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, Princeton 
(NJ), 1990) 96-121. 
478 Iris Marion Young 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship' in Roland Beiner (ed) Theorizing Citizenship (State University of New York Press, 
Albany, New York, 1995) 185. 
479 Young, above, 188; Patrick Macklem also argues that "the conditions of a just constitutional 
order cannot be determined without paying close attention to aspects of social reality - in 
particular .. . indigenous difference." Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the 
Constitution of Canada (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 25. 
480 Iris Marion Young 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship' in Roland Beiner (ed) Theorizing Citizenship (State University of New York Press, 
Albany, New York, 1995) 188. 
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groups' and that Young' s approach stalls decision-making and personal 
autonomy.
481 
However, in many important cases the oppressed groups are 
relatively simple to identify, and Dagger's objections do not outweigh the 
benefit that Young's approach brings in the relief of oppression. The 
questioning of the value of civic republican liberalism in multicultural societies 
is necessary where they have a history of oppression or where historic events 
provide a normative guide for constitutional frameworks. A common example 
of the latter point is the 'means of incorporation', which is discussed below. 
3 Indigenous autonomy and the means of incorporation 
Will Kymlicka also discusses an argument for indigenous autonomy 
based on the historical method of incorporation of national minorities into the 
wider state. Indigenous peoples have been incorporated into the state in many 
ways, most commonly military conquest or agreement of protection. Many 
liberal theorist s argue that it is illiberal for governments to do what outdated 
and unprincipled agreements require, instead of what equality and justice now 
require.482 Kymlicka's answer is that "[t]he equality argument assumes that the 
state must treat its citizens with equal respect. But there is a prior question of 
determining which citizens should be governed by which states."483 This prior 
question is resolved by examining the means of incorporation. The method of 
incorporation will often give rise to certain group-differentiated rights, often 
spelled out in the historical agreements that mandated incorporation.484 The 
historical incorporation argument asks "what are the terms under which two or 
more peoples decided to become partners. "485 Kymlicka views the respect of 
historical incorporation agreements as important in ensuring that citizens trust 
486 the government. 
481 Richard Dagger Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1997) 177-180. 
482 Dale Turner "Liberalism's Last Stand: Aboriginal Sovereignty and Minority Rights" in 
Curtis Cook and Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government: The Canadian 
and Mexican Experience in North American Perspective (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal & Kingston, 2000) 145. 
483 Turner, above, 145. 
484 Will Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) 117. 
485 Kymlicka, above, 118. 
486 Kymlicka, above, 119. 
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Dale Turner has supported Kymlicka's incorporation arguments, with 
the reservation of substantial further developments that seek government 
acknowledgement of indigenous conceptions of sovereignty. Turner emphasises 
that indigenous peoples are not merely minorities needing respect through 
minority-rights liberal theory,487 and this dislike of minority categorisation is 
evident among many First Nations people.488 While acknowledging the view of 
Kymlicka that liberal arguments must be used to persuade liberal governments, 
Turner argues that indigenous explanations of political sovereignty must be 
understood by non-indigenous citizens as one way of "renewing a just 
relationship, and, more importantly, of renewing hope in Indian Country".489 
Turner advises liberals to go beyond the national minority argument and 
emphasise the process of incorporation within the state.490 The contemporary 
liberal theory of rights, in the context of aboriginal peoples, "functions 
ahistorically: it begins from a rationally constructed theory of distributive 
justice that bestows a set of fundamental rights on all individuals and, as a 
consequence, a set of special rights to individuals who belong to minority 
cultures."491 Turner emphasises the unjust and incomplete incorporation of most 
First Nations into the Canadian state.492 Constitutional debate must examine 
"how governments can come to recognize the legitimacy of Aboriginal 
sovereignty in order to renew the political relationship on more just 
foundations. "493 
487 Dale Turner "Liberalism's Last Stand: Aboriginal Sovereignty and Minority Rights" in 
Curtis Cook and Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government: The Canadian 
and Mexican Experience in North American Perspective (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal & Kingston, 2000) 135. 
488 Richard Spaulding "Peoples as National Minorities: A Review of Will Kymlicka's 
Arguments For Aboriginal Rights from a Self-Determination Perspective" (1997) 47 U Toronto 
L J 35, 67-68. 
489 Turner, above, 137 
490 Turner, above, 144; Patrick Macklem joins with Turner in criticising Kymlicka for 
characterizing Aboriginal nations as 'previously self-governing', as this presupposes the 
legitimacy of the incorporation - Patrick Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution 
o{i Canada (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001) 73. 
4 1 Turner, above, 145. 
492 Dale Turner "Liberalism's Last Stand: Aboriginal Sovereignty and Minority Rights" in 
Curtis Cook and Juan D Lindau (eds) Aboriginal Rights and Self-Government: The Canadian 
a11d Mexica11 Experience in North American Perspective (McGill-Queens University Press, 
Montreal & Kingston, 2000) 146. 
493 Turner, above, 146. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
A Changing Paradigms of Indigenous Autonomy 
This paper has shown that the normative paradigms of indigenous 
autonomy in the US and Canada have changed significantly in the last 150 
years. The decisions of the judiciary and the legislature that have considered and 
affected indigenous autonomy during this time are evidence that allows the 
theoretical framework, or paradigm, within which the courts and legislatures act 
to be identified. 
The recognition of sovereignty paradigm is based on an 
acknowledgement of the historical sovereignty and military strength of tribes, 
and acknowledges that tribes were often incorporated into the state by means 
which guaranteed or suggested continuing internal sovereignty. Thus, this 
paradigm conforms to the notion, shared by Macklem, Young, Turner and 
Kymlicka, that just constitutional frameworks must be devised with reference to 
historical and social contexts. It must be remembered that even at the time that 
the Supreme Court was legally recognising this paradigm, it was subverted by 
President Jackson, and the issue was never seriously addressed in Canada. 
However, it does provide the basic foundation for current paradigms. 
The assimilation paradigm was influential for a significant period of 
time in both the US and Canada, buoyed by the general assimilatory 
assumptions that dominated the 18th and 19th centuries. Assimilation drew 
together ideas about converting indigenous peoples into civilised citizens of 
mainstream society, of ending differentiated rights and citizenship, and of 
freeing societies from the 'problem' of indigenous peoples. In this paradigm, 
indigenous autonomy was something to be destroyed, rather than something that 
deserved affirmation and protection. Although this paradigm has lost favour in 
recent times there is still a strong vein of liberal political philosophy that still 
favours this view. 
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The self-government paradigm that dominates in the US and Canada 
presently can be seen as some sort of return for respect of indigenous autonomy 
based on the recognition of the needs indigenous peoples have for traditional 
forms of governance, and the rights they never gave up when they were 
incorporated into the wider state. Both the United States and Canada 
acknowledge the importance of indigenous autonomy to indigenous peoples. 
The constitutional histories of the two countries influences the means by which 
the affirmation of indigenous autonomy is achieved, with Canada making 
treaties that carve out new First Nations jurisdictions and specify legislative 
powers and limitations in great detail. In contrast, the United States the Courts 
have been most influential in sculpting the current jurisdictional form of 
indigenous autonomy, with the legislature providing funding and making some 
corrections to judicial limitation of tribal jurisdiction. 
B Reconciling Tribalism and Liberalism 
The penultimate section showed that the executive, legislative and 
judicial organs of government in Canada and the United States have significant 
and determinative concerns about the perceived illiberalism of indigenous 
autonomy. Both governments have taken steps to limit the jurisdiction of 
indigenous governments over non-indigenous citizens. The Canadian 
government has sought to limit the powers of all First Nations governments by 
ensuring the application of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and has limited 
First Nations legislative power so that it impinges as little as possible on non-
First Nations rights. The United States judiciary has limited the civil and 
criminal jurisdiction of Native American governments over non-Indian citizens, 
based on arguments related to the exclusion of non-Indians from government 
and the importance of liberal citizenship rights. These examples make it clear 
that the ideology of political liberalism contains features that are antithetical to 
the full exercise of indigenous autonomy. 
However the philosophical tension between tribalism and liberalism 
may not be incommensurable, and reconciliation is possible and necessary. 
Indeed, much depends on the particular strain of liberalism that is promoted. 
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The proponents of the civic republican and constitutionalist version of political 
liberalism may continue to see tribalism as an assault on common citizenship 
and a sense of belonging to a single political community. But there are grave 
doubts about the necessity, or even possibility, of a single shared political 
community, especially in light of the recent 'unification' of Europe - states and 
unions can function satisfactorily even where differences in cultural and 
political communities exist. 
Furthermore, political liberalism may not be as blind or intolerant to 
differentiated citizenship and 'special rights' for indigenous peoples as 
commonly thought. The arguments of Kymlicka (and other liberals supportive 
of indigenous rights) outline plausible visions of liberal justice that take into 
account the importance of culture as a prerequisite for individual autonomy. 
Without government support for self-government and other rights that guarantee 
the existence of culture, indigenous peoples cannot exercise individual 
autonomy. These liberal arguments have been developed by Turner and 
Macklem, who argue that the way that previously sovereign indigenous peoples 
were incorporated into the wider states systems is necessary to understand the 
justice of differentiated rights and self-government. Citizens must be treated 
with equal respect, which includes examining and rectifying the consequences 
of unjust incorporation. The United States Supreme Court has provided 
examples of this process by characterising Native American tribes as 'political 
entities' with historical and ongoing relationships with the federal government. 
Furthermore, Young and Macklem present arguments for premising 
constitutional frameworks on the historical and social realities of any given 
society. This approach further emphasises the examination of the means of 
incorporation of indigenous peoples and their historical oppression by the state. 
C The North American Paradigms and New Zealand 
This paper has the primary focus of comparing the changing paradigms 
of indigenous autonomy that have existed in the United States and Canada since 
early colonial history, and examining the current constitutional tension between 
tribalism and liberalism. However, throughout its research and writing, the 
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insights gained and presented in this paper have stimulated further comparison 
with our own society, and this section will set out the simple conclusions 
reached in this respect. 
Many scholars have observed and detailed the relevant differences 
between indigenous-government relations in New Zealand and North 
America.
494 
For the purposes of this discussion, the two key differences are 
geographical and demographical. Geographically, North America is full of wide 
open spaces, which it one reason that Indian reserves were possible. This leads 
to the second, demographic, difference, for the existence of reserves meant that 
many indigenous North Americans could remain on their geographically-
defined reservations.495 These two key differences are usually determinate in 
arguments against territorial-based forms of self-government/autonomy and 
separate criminal justice systems.496 
Despite these differences effectively precluding North American-style 
indigenous autonomy in New Zealand, the paradigms of indigenous autonomy 
examined in this paper are vitally important in our society's current debates 
about liberal citizenship and indigenous rights. The ideals of 'civic republican' 
liberal citizenship that argue against any 'special rights' for Maori that result in 
differentiated citizenship are based on centuries-old British liberalism. Not only 
must New Zealand society examine new liberal theories that justify indigenous 
autonomy, but we must also look to the practice of two huge and highly-
respected liberal-democratic societies for examples of alternate paradigms of 
indigenous autonomy. When we debate the justice of separate Maori seats in 
Parliament, treaty-rights, and claims of native title, we cannot merely measure 
justice against 'civic republican' liberalism's fundamental tenets of equal 
individual citizenship. It is necessary to examine the practice of states that do 
494 See Matthew Palmer "International Law/lntercultural Relations" (2000) I Chi. J. lnt'l L. 159, 
161-162 and PG McHugh "Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and 
Australasia" in PG McHugh and Ken S Coates Living Relationships, Kokiri Ngatahi: The 
Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998) 142-
143; 172-174. 
495 Palmer, above, 161-162. 
496 McHugh, above, 142-143; 172-174. 
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recognise indigenous difference and autonomy to decide whether such practices 
are viable or necessary here. 
In particular, it is vital for New Zealand to acknowledge that Maori 
rights are political, based on the historical relationship that Maori tribes forged 
with the British colonials. Without this acknowledgement, New Zealand society 
and government will be ignoring history, for the Treaty of Waitangi was signed 
and understood by Maori as a reaffirmation of their political structures (and, as 
often argued, their political independence). New Zealand's paradigm of 
indigenous autonomy should seek to accord with the fundamental recognition of 
independent political status found in the Cherokee cases, and the current 
Canadian policy of recognising the prior sovereignty of First Nations Canadians 
through the facilitation of self-government. In an era that has seen the fall of 
colonialism and the rise of self-determination, the justice of constitutional 
frameworks for indigenous autonomy in states where colonisation cannot be 
reversed is one of the most important normative concerns of our time. 
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